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DUDE, WHERE'S MY CAR TITLE?:
THE LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND
ECONOMICS OF TITLE LENDING
MARKETS
Kathryn Fritzdixon*
Jim Hawkins**
Paige Marta Skiba***
Millions of credit-constrained borrowers turn to title loans every
year to meet their liquidity needs. Legislatures and regulators have
debated how to best regulate these transactions, but surprisingly, we
still know very little about the customers who use title loans. This Ar-
ticle reports findings from the first large-scale academic study of title
lending customers. We surveyed over 450 title lending customers
across three states and obtained information about customers' demo-
graphic and behavioral characteristics.
Based on the results of our survey, and guided by insights from
behavioral economics, this Article seeks to reframe the title lending
debate. Instead of focusing on the risks and consequences of borrow-
ers' cars being repossessed, as the vast bulk of the literature does, we
argue that the primary problem that most borrowers face is underes-
timating the true cost of taking out a title loan. Borrowers' survey re-
sponses demonstrate that many borrowers are overly optimistic and
experience self-control problems that affect their ability to make
timely loan payments. We argue that these deviations from the as-
sumptions of classical economics do not warrant an outright ban of ti-
tle lending, but they do provide room for policy interventions. Poli-
cymakers can improve efficiency in title lending markets by requiring
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lenders to disclose to consumers the likely experiences they will have
with their title loans rather than merely requiring lenders to com-
municate pricing information.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Millions of people who are outside the mainstream banking system
turn to title loans each year as a means of accessing credit.1  Every year
around 7500 title lenders make more than $1.5 billion in loans across the
country.2 In Texas alone in 2012, borrowers took out almost $500 million
in title loans.3 Title loans are high-cost, short-term, small-dollar loans se-
cured by a vehicle that the borrower usually owns outright. The most
1. See generally Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto Title Lending,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535 (2012) (describing title lending transactions) [hereinafter Hawkins, Cred-
it on Wheels].
2. Jean Ann Fox et al., Driven to Disaster: Car-Title Lending and Its Impact on Consumers,
CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.responsiblelending.org/other-
consumer-loans/car-title-loans/research-analysis/CRL-Car-Title-Report-FINAL.pdf (finding that "ap-
proximately 7,730 car-title lenders operate in at least 21 states costing borrowers $3.6 billion each year
in interest on $1.6 billion in loans").
3. OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMMISSIONER, 2012 CREDIT ACCESS BUS. ANN. REP. 3
(May 6, 2013), available at http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/publications/consolidated-reports/CAB/
050613%20CAB %20Annual%20CAB %20Report.pdf.
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common term for the loan is one month, the interest rate charged is
commonly around 300% (when expressed as an annual percentage rate),
and the lender has the right to repossess the borrower's vehicle if the
borrower defaults on the loan.4
The fact that these loans typically have high interest rates and
threaten to deprive borrowers of their means of transportation has gen-
erated significant concern about the loans' welfare effects at both the
state5 and federal level.6 Law on title lending differs greatly throughout
the country, with some states banning the industry entirely and others al-
lowing it to operate with virtually no oversight. It is also in flux. For in-
stance, in 2008, New Hampshire effectively shut the doors of all of its ti-
tle lenders by imposing a thirty-six percent interest rate cap, but then
repealed the cap and welcomed lenders back only four years later.8 Even
local governments in cities across the country, like Chicago, are currently
considering regulations to restrict title lending.9 The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, the federal agency in charge of consumer credit regu-
lation, has the power to pass rules for title lenders1° and has shown inter-
est in fringe banking companies,11 but is still in the midst of considering
what actions to take.
This regulatory uncertainty entreats a critical analysis of how lend-
ers and customers act in title lending markets. A general examination of
consumer credit markets is insufficient because it misses the unique con-
cerns generated by title lending. Moreover, a theoretical analysis of how
classical economic principles would operate in the title lending market is
inadequate because customers frequently deviate from the assumptions
made in these models.12 As Oren Bar-Gill has noted, "Regulation should
4. See generally Hawkins, Credit on Wheels, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Gov Vetoes Bill to Raise Title Loan Interest in NH, YAHOO! NEWS (July 6, 2011, 4:28
PM), http://news.yahoo.com/gov-vetoes-bill-raise-title-loan-interest-nh-202828930.html (discussing the
New Hampshire Governor's decision to veto a bill permitting title lending because of the risk title
lending poses to borrowers' continued employment).
6. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. H5181-02 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Rep. Mascara)
(arguing that title lending customers "depend on their automobiles and trucks for transportation to
their jobs, vital medical appointments, and school for their children" and concluding that "the loss of a
vehicle through an unfair foreclosure often results in the loss of a job or other serious consequences").
7. Garry Rayno, Lynch Vetoes Bill that Would Allow Interest Rates to Top 400% a Year, UNION
LEADER (Jan. 27, 2012, 2:48 PM), http://www.unionleader.com/article/20120127/NEWS06/120129914
&template=mobileart.
8. Garry Rayno, NH Joins Other States to Help Protect Consumers Against Predatory Lenders,
UNION LEADER (Oct. 6, 2012, 8:02PM), http://www.unionleader.com/article/20120127/NEWS06/1201
29914&template=mobileart.
9. See Press Release, City of Chicago, Mayor Emanuel Announces New Reforms to Protect
Chicago Families from Financial Fraud (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://www.cityofchicago.org/
city/en/depts/mayor/press-room/press-releases/2012/december 2012/mayor-emanuel-announcesnewr
eformstoprotectchicagofamiliesfromfin.html [hereinafter Press Release, City of Chicago].
10. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (giving the Bureau authority to "regulate the offering and provision of consumer
financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws").
11. See Press Release, City of Chicago, supra note 9 (describing a partnership between the Bu-
reau and the city of Chicago aimed at stopping title lending abuses).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 138-90 (outlining several ways people behave in opposi-
tion to the predictions of classical economics).
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only be considered where such specific evidence proves the existence, in
the specific market, of a behavioral market failure that generates signifi-
cant welfare costs .... [A]ny legal intervention must be based on a de-
tailed, market-specific inquiry."13
Although other fringe banking issues have received significant criti-
cal attention in the legal literature, 14 most of the important empirical
questions about title lending remain unanswered, especially questions
surrounding the characteristics and behavior of people who use title
loans. 5 To craft optimal title lending regulation, however, policymakers
need to understand who uses title loans and why, what risks people face
in using them, and whether people using title loan products conform to
the assumptions of the rational actor model used in traditional economics
(and by many policymakers). In other alternative financial services mar-
kets, significant information about these issues already exists. The Fed-
eral Reserve's Survey of Consumer Finances asks subjects about payday
loan use,16 and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") Na-
tional Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households asks about al-
ternative financial services other than title loans. Similarly, Michael
Barr gathered detailed information about the demographic characteris-
tics of consumers using a wide variety of short-term credit other than title
loans. 8 But, none of the existing scholarship answers these critical ques-
tions for title lending markets.
This Article is the first large-scale empirical investigation of the cus-
tomers who use title loans. Based on a survey of over 450 customers, in
three states, we find that the typical title lending customer has a moder-
ate level of education, is middle-aged, is white, and is a woman. Using
survey evidence, we make the case that in general, customers suffer from
behavioral biases that impede perfectly rational use of the title loan
product. Namely, they are overly optimistic, have limited self-control,
and display limited attention. Yet, the results are not overwhelming, and
the responses in our surveys discredit the idea in some prior work that
title lending customers are a vulnerable, irrational population.
13. Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749,
801-02 (2008).
14. For some recent examples in the legal literature, see Mechele Dickerson, Vanishing Financial
Freedom, 61 ALA. L. REV. 1079 (2010); Richard Hynes, Payday Lending, Bankruptcy, and Insolvency,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 607 (2012); Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and
Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451 (2008); Ronald J. Mann & Jim Haw-
kins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855 (2007); Christopher L. Peterson, Usury Law, Payday
Loans, and Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN.
L. REV. 1110 (2008).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 91-100 summarizing the existing literature.
16. Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances, From 2004 to 2007: Evidence From
the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RESERVE BULLETIN A47, (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scf 2007.htm.
17. 2011 FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED
AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS 1, 6 (SEPT. 2012), available at http://www.fdic.gov/household
survey/2012_unbankedreport-app-g.pdf [hereinafter FDIC SURVEY].
18. Michael S. Barr et al., Borrowing to Make Ends Meet, in No SLACK: THE FINANCIAL LIVES
OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 133, 146-51 (Michael S. Barr ed., 2012) (reporting demographic infor-
mation about short-term loan borrowers in a study of households in Detroit).
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This Article aims to reframe the debate over title lending. Instead
of merely focusing on the risk and consequences of repossession, we ar-
gue that the primary risk the vast majority of consumers face using title
loans is that they will underestimate the true cost of the loan. Consum-
ers, we contend, make systematic mistakes as they consider the loan and
weigh its perceived costs and benefits. Repossession affects few borrow-
ers, and our evidence indicates that most borrowers will not lose their
only way to work because of repossession. Thus, prohibitions on title
loans based on the premise that borrowers are frequently losing their ve-
hicles are misguided. The optimal regulatory response, we argue, is re-
quiring disclosures that inform customers of the true cost of title lending,
including the likely ways in which the borrower will use the loan and not
merely the pricing of the loan.
We begin in Part II by explaining the methodology of our survey
and describing the regulatory reports that we obtained for this paper.
We partnered with a large title lending company to administer surveys,
informed by previous behavioral economics literature, to all customers,
who came into ten different stores in three different states (Idaho, Geor-
gia, and Texas), to take out a title loan or make a payment on an existing
title loan. The survey asked about the borrowers' demographics, loan
usage patterns, and time and risk preferences. We also obtained reports
from the Idaho and Texas state regulatory agencies to determine the
proportion of cars being used as collateral that are repossessed.
Part III describes the law that currently governs title lending at the
federal level and locally in the three jurisdictions in which we surveyed
customers. This Part explains the legal backdrop against which title loan
companies operate. It serves as a general introduction to title lending
law and offers a starting point as we discuss our policy recommendations.
Part IV discusses the demographics of the customers in our survey.
We find that the typical title lending customer is an older, white woman
who is moderately well educated. It also considers the demographic
makeup of customers surveyed in previous studies of fringe banking cus-
tomers for comparison, and we also compare title lending customers to
the general populations in Georgia, Idaho, and Texas.
In Part V, we review the behavioral economics literature relevant to
credit markets serving low-income households. We discuss the theoreti-
cal underpinnings and review the empirical and experimental support for
a number of behavioral anomalies. We find that title customers are
moderately overly optimistic about the time it will take them to pay off
their loans and mispredict their ability to save to pay off the loan in the
near future.
Finally, we conclude in Part VI by discussing our study's implica-
tions for title lending policy. We suggest that policymakers should use
behaviorally informed disclosures to maximize efficient use of title loans.
By disclosing pattern-of-use information along with pricing early enough
in the transaction to affect consumer decision making, the law can aid in
No. 4]
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combating the biases customers experience when considering title loans.
Finally, we argue that states that have prohibited title lending have done
so without sufficient empirical warrant; the risk of customers losing their
jobs due to repossession has been vastly overstated and title lending cus-
tomers are not the irrational, vulnerable population that previous schol-
arship has envisioned.
II. METHODOLOGY
To learn more about title lending customers, we surveyed over 450
borrowers across ten locations (title lending firm storefronts). To admin-
ister the survey, we partnered with a large title lending firm that operates
in numerous states. By doing so, we were able to reach a much larger
sample of customers than other research has been capable of reaching.
For example, one of us (Jim Hawkins) previously attempted to survey
title lending customers by positioning research assistants outside title
lending locations and asking people to participate as they left the store.19
Using this method, he was only able to survey thirty-five customers after
100 person-hours of work. By partnering with the lender we were able to
survey a much larger sample, 453 customers.20  Our approach follows
previous studies in other consumer credit markets that have successfully
partnered with firms to reach a larger sample. 21
We created the survey instrument using standard demographic and
behavioral economic questions, as well as questions about the borrowers'
expectations for the loans and their usage patterns. The behavioral ques-
tions are used to determine how much risk borrowers are willing to ac-
cept and how much they care about the future. We developed the ques-
tions for our survey by reviewing the literature on title lending
specifically and behavioral economics more generally, by using the prior
experience Hawkins had surveying title lending customers with a similar
instrument, and by the company pre-testing an earlier draft of the survey
instrument with a small group of customers. 22 We included four ques-
tions on the survey that the company specifically wanted answered. The
19. See generally Hawkins, Credit on Wheels, supra note 1.
20. Other empirical research on consumer credit use has similar numbers of survey subjects. See,
e.g., Emma Davies & Stephen E. G. Lea, Student Attitudes to Student Debt, 16 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 663,
667 (1995) (140 subjects); Jeff Joireman et al., Concern with Immediate Consequences Magnifies the
Impact of Compulsive Buying Tendencies on College Students' Credit Card Debt, 44 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 155, 162 (2010) (249 subjects); Phylis M. Mansfield et al., Self-Control and Credit-Card Use
Among College Students, 92 PSYCHOL. REP. 1067, 1072 (2003) (165 subjects); Nathalie Martin, 1,000%
Interest -Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIz. L. REV.
563, 597 (2010) (109 subjects).
21. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive Biases, and
Payday Borrowing, 66 J. FIN. 1856 (2011) (partnering with a payday loan firm to test the effects of dif-
ferent disclosure regimes).
22. The only important change made after the pretesting was to eliminate a question about an-
nual income because it did not appear that customers were answering the question we intended to ask,
such as stating weekly or monthly income amounts instead of annual income amounts. Because other
research discusses title lending customers' incomes, we did not pursue this issue. See Nathalie Martin
& Ernesto Longa, High-Interest Loans and Class: Do Payday and Title Loans Really Serve the Middle
Class?, 24 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 524, 547 (2012).
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questions the company wanted included were #11, 12, 13, and 19. Other
than reviewing our research to ensure the company remained anony-
mous, the company did not have any say in our results. The survey is
presented in Appendix A.
The surveys were completed in November and December 2012.
The company chose ten representative stores in three different states:
Idaho, Georgia, and Texas. The states have three distinct approaches to
regulating title loans, although there are similarities that allow us to
meaningfully compare consumers across all states. All three states allow
very high interest rates on title loans and have some form of disclosure
requirement.23
We mailed fifty surveys to each title lending location (three in Texas
and Georgia and four in Idaho), along with directions on how to adminis-
ter the survey and forms for record keeping. Each title lender employee
was instructed to offer the survey to all customers who took out or made
a payment on a loan as long as they had not already completed a survey.
The borrowers put their surveys in envelopes and sealed them so that
they could be sure that their answers were confidential. All customers
who completed the survey were given an informed consent form, and the
University of Houston Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects
approved the study.24 In return for completing the survey, each borrower
received a $10 Target or Wal-Mart gift card. To ensure that no one com-
pleted more than one survey, the borrower's name was checked against
the list of individuals who had already received a gift card. The employ-
ee recorded daily the number of completed surveys and the number of
individuals who turned down the survey. The response rate was high at
78.8%.25 Broken down by state, surveys were completed by 200 borrow-
ers at four stores in Idaho, 149 borrowers at three stores in Texas, and
104 borrowers at three stores in Georgia.
By partnering with the title lending company, we were also able to
offer the survey to all customers, making selection errors less likely at the
customer level, though they may still be present at the store level. Thus
while the stores were not randomly selected, the survey was offered to
the entire population of borrowers at those stores during the study
period.
Although we have a larger sample size than many other studies,
there are still some limitations to our research design. First, the survey
data is all self-reported, and we do not attempt to verify the answers.
23. See infra Part III. The different regulatory approaches are specifically discussed, along with
the implications of these differences.
24. The protocol number is 13070-EX.
25. From our completion reports from eight of the ten stores, 396 customers completed the sur-
vey, and 104 declined to take the survey. The two stores that did not provide completion reports also
had fewer completed surveys, so it is likely the response rate would be lower if data from those stores
were available. Since together they represent only twenty percent of the planned surveys, this effect
would not be too severe.
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This approach, however, is frequently used in the literature on consumer
credit products.26
Second, we only surveyed borrowers at ten locations of one com-
pany so our sample is not nationally representative. In one sense, this is
beneficial; because the relevant laws in our states are similar enough that
we can aggregate the borrowers across stores. On the other hand, this
means that we cannot directly generalize our results to the national level.
Most other studies of title lending have the same limitation, and we do
not have reason to believe that our ten stores are significantly different
from other stores operated by this lender.
What may be a larger limitation is the fact that we have only part-
nered with one company. If borrowers who choose our title lending
company are significantly different from those that choose other title
lenders, this will create selection bias in our results. 27 Most other studies
in this area are also conducted with just one partner company, however,
so this limitation is not unique to our paper.28
In addition to the survey data, we also gathered data on the title
lending industry from the state regulatory agencies in Texas and Idaho. 29
Importantly, this data includes the repossession rates in these two states.
The data provides additional insight into the consequences of title lend-
ing. Georgia does not regulate title loans at the state level through a
statewide licensing requirement,30 so data about repossession rates in
Georgia does not currently exist. We present this data with the caveat
that it is originally self-reported by the lenders and not subject to review
by the state agencies.
The reports from state regulators show that less than 10% of cars
are repossessed in the two states at hand. In Idaho in 2011,31 customers
took out 27,510 new title loans.3 2 Of these loans, 2694 resulted in a vehi-
cle being repossessed (with the other borrowers retaining their vehi-
cles);33 thus, 9.79% of title loans in 2011 in Idaho resulted in reposses-
sions. In Texas in 2012, 7.83% of customers using single payment title
26. See Jim Hawkins, The CARD Act on Campus, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1471, 1484 (2012)
(collecting studies using this approach for credit card research).
27. For example, the company with which we partnered does not require a pay stub in Georgia,
but at least one local competitor does require a pay stub to make a loan -meaning that customers who
cannot provide a pay stub may be disproportionately represented in our company's customer base.
28. See, e.g., Sumit Agarwal, et al., Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and Credit
Scoring Puzzles?, 99 AER PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 412 (2009); Bertrand & Morse, supra note 21
(partnering with a single payday lender).
29. The data from New Mexico has been extensively discussed in Martin and Adams' work. See
generally Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and Demo-
graphic Realities in Title Lending, 77 Mo. L. REV. 41, 45 (2012). Similarly, Hawkins' article Credit on
Wheels presents the regulatory data from Virginia, Oregon, Illinois, and Montana. See generally
Hawkins, Credit on Wheels, supra note 1.
30. See infra text accompanying note 72.
31. The 2011 data is the most current data available from Idaho regulators at the time of writing.
32. E-mail from Anthony Polidori, Idaho Dep't of Fin. (Jan. 8, 2013, 11:09 CST) (on file with
author) [hereinafter E-mail from Anthony Polidori].
33. Id. 2,261 vehicles were actually sold by the lender.
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loans had experienced repossessions.3 4  Texas' report does not discuss
how many vehicles were redeemed by borrowers, so the figures overstate
the number of vehicles borrowers actually lost.35
III. TITLE LENDING LAW
This Part offers details about the title lending laws in the three
states we studied. This description provides the legal context for how
states have approached title lending and affords us the opportunity to of-
fer new regulatory directions in light of the existing laws.
States have adopted a variety of approaches to regulating title lend-
ing.36 Some states effectively ban title loans by setting an interest rate
cap at such a low rate that no lenders will operate there,3 while others
authorize title lending with few laws even tailored to title loans38 or allow
lenders to circumvent usury caps. 3 Other states permit and regulate title
loans through existing laws designed to address other types of credit,
such as pawnshop lending.40 Finally, some states have laws that were cre-
ated specifically to address title loan transactions. 41
Title loans in all of the states we studied are governed by the federal
Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"). Among other requirements, TILA ob-
ligates lenders to disclose the total finance charges for title loans and to
present the cost of loans as an annual percentage rate ("APR"). 42 In ad-
dition to TILA, the Talent-Nelson Amendment prevents lenders in any
state from charging more than thirty-six percent APR to members of the
military.43 This statute has effectively ended traditional title lending to
military personnel and their family/dependents. 44 Finally, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau has authority to regulate title lending,45 al-
though it has not yet enacted any title lending regulations.
34. Financial Services Activity Reports, OFF. CONSUMER CREDIT COMM'R,
http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/publications/FinSvcsActvityRpts.html#CABRpts (last visited Mar.
29, 2014). There were 27,219 repossessions for the 347,459 customers with whom companies worked
in 2012. Id.
35. For instance, the New Mexico state report separates out vehicles repossessed and vehicles
redeemed. See Martin & Adams, supra note 29. Idaho indicates both the number of vehicles repos-
sessed and the number sold. E-mail from Anthony Polidori, supra note 32.
36. See Hawkins, Credit on Wheels, supra note 1, at 572-88 (surveying state title lending laws).
37. See, e.g., 9 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 41a(b)(4) (West 2014) (capping loans secured by vehicles
older than the previous model year at 20% APR).
38. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-291(G) (2014) (setting a generous interest rate cap on
title loans without other laws regulating the industry).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 80-90 (discussing how title lending companies operate in
Texas).
40. See Floyd v. Title Exch. & Pawn of Anniston, Inc., 620 So. 2d 576, 579 (Ala. 1993) (holding
that Alabama's pawn laws apply to title loans).
41. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 45-15-105 (West 2014).
42. 15 U.S.C. §1632(a) (2012).
43. 10 U.S.C. § 987(b), (d)(2)(A) (2012).
44. See generally Patrick M. Aul, Federal Usury Law for Service Members: The Talent-Nelson
Amendment, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 163 (2008).
45. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010); see generally Jim Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, 15
CHAP. L. REV. 23 (2011) (describing the scope of the Bureau's power over title lenders).
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In some places, title lending companies must comply with city ordi-
nances, as well as state and federal law.46 In Texas, for instance, Austin,
Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio have passed ordinances that regulate
how title lending companies offer loans, and other Texas cities are con-
sidering similar measures. 41 Yet, none of the cities in which our survey
was administered had ordinances that substantially affect the title loan
transaction itself.4
The three jurisdictions involved in our survey represent three dis-
tinct approaches to title lending regulation. Idaho has a statute specifi-
cally designed for title loans; Georgia uses its pawnbroker law to regulate
title lending; and Texas, while it has historically allowed lenders to oper-
ate under its Credit Service Organization law with minimal oversight, re-
cently enacted some provisions aimed directly at title loan companies.
Despite some similarities between specific laws in these different frame-
works, such as the requirement that title loan companies obtain licenses
with the state or municipal governments, 49 these states have adopted
somewhat different approaches to regulating title lending transactions.
A. Idaho
In Idaho, the general provisions in Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code ("U.C.C.") that deals with secured loans apply to title
loans,50 except to the extent that an Idaho statute specifically aimed at ti-
tle loans displaces those general provisions.51 Thus, like all secured credi-
tors, title lenders in Idaho must meet three specific formalities in order
for their security interest to attach to the vehicle.5 2 First, there must be
value given by both parties.53 Second, the debtor must have rights in the
collateral.54  And finally, there needs to be an authenticated security
agreement.55 In addition to the Article 9 provisions, Idaho's statute
46. Christopher L. Peterson, "Warning: Predatory Lender"-A Proposal for Candid Predatory
Small Loan Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893, 898 (2012).
47. Cindy Ramirez, El Paso City Council to Vote on Title-loan Regulation This Week, EL PASO
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2013, http://www.elpasotimes.com/ci-22291120/city-votes-title-loan-regulation-this-
week.
48. Most of the cities involved in our study have no specific ordinances, and the city ordinances
that do apply to our subject stores primarily involve permits and record keeping. See, e.g., MARIETTA,
GA. CODE ORDINANCES, 8, ch. 12 art.12 § 050 (2014).
49. The Idaho and Texas state codes both require licensing. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-503(1)
(West 2014); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 393.603 (West 2014). Georgia's state law authorizes municipali-
ties to license lenders. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-136 (West 2014). ("Municipal authorities may license
pawnbrokers, define their powers and privileges by ordinance, impose taxes upon them, revoke their
licenses, and exercise such general supervision as will ensure fair dealing between the pawnbroker and
his customers."). Some cities have exercised this authority. See, e.g., MARIETTA, GA., CODE
ORDINANCES pt 8, ch. 12, art. 12, § 050 (2014) ("It is unlawful for any person to engage in, conduct or
carry on within the City of Marietta any pawnshop, as defined herein, without a permit or a currently
valid occupation tax certificate to do so.").
50. U.C.C. § 9-101 (2007).
51. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-502(3) (West 2014).
52. U.C.C. § 9-201 (2007).
53. Id. § 9-203(b)(1).
54. Id. § 9-203(b)(2).
55. Id. § 9-203(b)(3).
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mandates that title lenders include the following information in their title
loan agreement: make, model, and year of the titled personal property;
VIN and license plate number; name, address and date of birth of the
debtor; date the agreement is executed; and the maturity date of the title
loan agreement. 6 Under Article 9, the secured creditor must perfect that
interest to obtain priority over other creditors and purchasers,5 and
maintain perfection throughout various potential changes in the collat-
eral, the jurisdiction in which the collateral is held, and the name of the
debtor. 8
Article 9 leaves the definition of a "default" on the loan for the par-
ties to stipulate in their individual security agreements. 9 Once a default
has occurred, the secured party has a number of rights concerning the
collateral. Most importantly, the secured party has the right to take pos-
session after default, so long as there is no "breach of the peace."60 The
secured party may also initiate a so-called "Article 9 sale" so long as the
sale is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner.61 The debtor
must receive notice from the secured party of such disposition of collat-
eral.62 The secured party may also accept and keep the collateral in full
or partial satisfaction of the outstanding debt.63 Finally, the debtor may
redeem his interest and receive his property back from the secured party
if he pays off all of the debt owing.' 4 If the secured party does not com-
ply with the U.C.C. in dealings with the debtor, the debtor may be enti-
tled to certain damages.65
In addition to the Article 9 provisions, Idaho's statute mandates
that title lenders include the following disclosure in each loan agreement:
(1) This loan is not intended to meet long-term financial needs.
(2) You should use this loan only to meet short-term cash needs.
(3) You will be required to pay additional interest and fees if you
renew this loan rather than pay the debt in full when due.
(4) This loan may be a higher interest loan. You should consider
what other lower cost loans may be available to you.
(5) You are placing at risk your continued ownership of the titled
personal property you are using as security for this loan.
(6) If you default under this loan the title lender may take posses-
sion of the titled personal property used as security for this loan and
sell the property in the manner provided by law.
(7) If you enter into a title loan agreement, you have a legal right of
rescission. This means you may cancel your contract at no cost to
56. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-504(1) (West 2014).
57. U.C.C. § 9-308 (2007).
58. Id. § 9-316, 507.
59. Id. § 9-601 cmt. 3.
60. Id. § 9-609.
61. Id. § 9-610.
62. Id. § 9-611.
63. Id. § 9-620.
64. Id. § 9-623.
65. Id. § 9-625.
No. 4]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
you by returning the money you borrowed by the next business day
after the date of your loan.
(8) If you believe that the title lender has violated the provisions of
the Idaho Title Loan Act, you have the right to file a written com-
plaint with the Idaho Department of Finance and the Department
will investigate your complaint.
Along with these disclosure rules, the state requires that title loans be
thirty days in length, but it allows them to be renewed automatically. It
does not impose a limit on the amount of interest the title lender charges
for the loan, but it does limit the amount of the loan relative to the value
of the vehicle. 8 There are no limits on the number of times a loan can be
rolled over (renewed), but the statute requires that on the third renewal
of a loan, the debtor must make an additional principal payment and pay
the interest due on the loan. The statute states: "the debtor shall be re-
quired to make a payment of at least ten percent (10%) of the principal
amount of the original title loan in addition to any finance charges that
are due. 6 9
If the debtor defaults on the loan, there are two important rules
governing the situation, beyond the general rules in Article 9. First, the
lender is required to mail a letter to the debtor informing the debtor that
"the debtor has ten (10) days from the date of the notice in which to cure
the default."' Second, the statute specifically prohibits lenders from col-
lecting any deficiency from the debtor personally unless the debtor pre-
vents repossession, damages the vehicle, or commits fraud; the lender's
only recourse is to repossess the vehicle.1
B. Georgia
Georgia regulates title loans as pawn loans, specifically including ti-
tle lending in its definition of "pledged goods," which the statute defines
as "tangible personal property, including, without limitation, all types of
motor vehicles or any motor vehicle certificate of title, which property is
purchased by, deposited with, or otherwise actually delivered into the
possession of a pawnbroker in connection with a pawn transaction." 72 In
addition to the general rules governing pawnbrokers, Georgia's statute
has several rules that apply specifically to title lending.
Georgia has a disclosure requirement with simpler language than
the Idaho statute (in addition to other disclosure rules similar to those
66. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-46-504(2)(c) (West 2014).
67. Id. § 28-46-506(1).
68. Id. § 28-46-508(3) (prohibiting loans "in which the amount of money loaned, when combined
with the outstanding balance of other outstanding title loan agreements the debtor has with the same
lender secured by any single titled personal property, exceeds the retail value of the titled personal
property as determined by common motor vehicle appraisal guides").
69. Id. § 28-46-506(3).
70. Id. § 28-46-507(1).
71. Id. § 28-46-508(2) (West 2014).
72. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-12-130(5) (West 2014).
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required by federal law)." Lenders must include the statement: "Failure
to make your payment as described in this document can result in the
loss of your motor vehicle. The pawnbroker can also charge you certain
fees if he or she actually repossesses the motor vehicle."' 4 Like Idaho,
Georgia mandates that title loans be for thirty days," but unlike Idaho,
Georgia's law does not govern rollovers in any way, and it puts caps on
the fees that lenders may charge, although the caps are high.6
If the borrower defaults, the statute empowers the lender to repos-
sess the vehicle," but it sets limits on the fees lenders can charge in con-
nection with the repossession.8 Like Idaho, Georgia prohibits agree-
ments that make the borrower personally liable for the debt."
C. Texas
Title loan companies in Texas operate under a unique arrangement
in which the title loan company does not generally directly lend the cus-
tomers any money. Instead, they act as Credit Service Organizations
("CSOs"), which are organizations that, under the Texas Finance Code,
either improve consumers' credit histories or obtain extensions of con-
sumer credit on behalf of consumers. 0 As a CSO, the title loan company
brokers a loan between the consumer and a third-party lender. The title
loan company guarantees the loan for the lender and charges a fee to the
customer.81 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
affirmed that this statute permits payday lenders to operate in this man-
ner,82 and until recently, title loan companies operating as CSOs were
73. Id. §§ 44-12-138(b)(5) (6).
74. Id. § 44-12-138(b)(3).
75. Id. § 44-12-131(a)(1).
76. Id. § 44-12-131(a)(4)(A) ("During the first 90 days of any pawn transaction or extension or
continuation of the pawn transaction, a pawnbroker may charge for each 30 day period interest and
pawnshop charges which together equal no more than 25 percent of the principal amount advanced,
with a minimum charge of up to $10.00 per 30 day period.").
77. Id. § 44-12-131(a)(3).
78. Id. § 44-12-131(a)(4)(C) ("In addition to the charges provided for in subparagraphs (A) and
(B) of this paragraph, in a pawn transaction or in any extension or continuation of a pawn transaction
involving a motor vehicle or a motor vehicle certificate of title, a pawnbroker may charge the follow-
ing... (ii) No more than $5.00 per day in storage fees, but only if an actual repossession pursuant to a
default takes place on a vehicle which was not already in the pawnbroker's possession and only for
each day the pawnbroker must actually retain possession of the motor vehicle; and (iii) A repossession
fee of $50.00 within 50 miles of the office where the pawn originated, $100.00 within 51 to 100 miles,
$150.00 within 101 to 300 miles and a fee of $250.00 beyond 300 miles, but only if an actual reposses-
sion pursuant to a default takes place on a vehicle which was not already in the pawnbroker's posses-
sion.").
79. Id. § 44-12-137(a)(7).
80. TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 393.001(3)(A) (B) (West 2014).
81. EZCORP Inc. Reports Operating Results (10-K), GURuFocus (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.
gurufocus.com/news/78990/ezcorp-inc-reports-operating-results-10k ("Our services include arranging
loans with independent third-party lenders, assisting in the preparation of loan applications and loan
documents, and accepting loan payments for the lenders. We do not make, fund or participate in the
loans made by the lenders, but we assist customers in obtaining credit and enhance their creditworthi-
ness by issuing a letter of credit to guarantee the customer's payment obligations to the independent
third-party lender.").
82. Lovick v. Ritemoney, Ltd., 378 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004).
No. 4]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
under little direct regulation. As in Idaho, title loan companies in Texas
had to comply with Article 9's provisions and TILA, but otherwise they
had substantial leeway in conducting their business.
In 2011, the Texas legislature passed a law that required CSOs act-
ing as "credit access businesses" to follow certain guidelines starting in
January 2012.83 The most significant provisions relate to disclosures title
lending companies must make. First, in a conspicuous place at each lend-
ing location, title lending companies must post a notice that says:
An advance of money obtained through a payday loan or auto title
loan is not intended to meet long-term financial needs. A payday
loan or auto title loan should only be used to meet immediate short-
term cash needs. Refinancing the loan rather than paying the debt
in full when due will require the payment of additional charges.8
4
In addition to this posted disclosure, the statute lays out several
other remarkable disclosures that lenders must make,85 including the fol-
lowing information:
(1) the interest, fees, and annual percentage rates, as applicable, to
be charged on a deferred presentment transaction or on a motor
vehicle title loan, as applicable, in comparison to interest, fees, and
annual percentage rates to be charged on other alternative forms of
consumer debt;
(2) the amount of accumulated fees a consumer would incur by re-
newing or refinancing a deferred presentment transaction or motor
vehicle title loan that remains outstanding for a period of two
weeks, one month, two months, and three months; and
(3) information regarding the typical pattern of repayment of de-
ferred presentment transactions and motor vehicle title loans. 6
With regard to title lending in particular, the company must warn cus-
tomers that "the consumer may be required to surrender possession of
the motor vehicle to the lender or other person to satisfy the consumer's
outstanding obligations under the loan."8  Finally, the new Texas law
also imposes reporting requirements on title loan companies.88
Beyond these disclosure laws, Texas continues to have little direct
title lending regulation. It imposes no limit on the charges companies can
assess,89 no requirements for how long loans must last, no limits on the
number of times a borrower rolls over a loan, and no limit on the loan
amount. The rules in Article 9 concerning when a borrower defaults on a
loan apply to title loans in Texas. Unlike the laws in Idaho and Georgia
which alter the U.C.C.'s rule, Article 9 allows title loan companies to sue
83. TEX. FiN. CODE ANN. § 393.221 393.224 (West 2014).
84. Id. § 393.222(a)(3).
85. These pattern of use disclosures are unique because most consumer credit disclosures focus
merely on conveying static price information. See infra text accompanying notes 177-85.
86. TEX. FiN. CODE ANN. § 393.223(a) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
87. Id. § 393.223(b).
88. Id. § 393.627.
89. The CSO statute does not limit the amount CSOs can charge for their loan brokering ser-
vices. See id. § 393.001.
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borrowers for any amount remaining due on the loan after the collateral
is sold.9"
All of these laws, at both the state and federal level, have been
passed without any information about the demographics of title lending
customers or their behavioral tendencies. Parts IV and V take up these
questions in hope of better informing these legislative decisions.
IV. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF CUSTOMERS IN TITLE LENDING MARKETS
Understanding who uses title loans is important in assessing
whether regulation of title lending is advisable and what types of regula-
tion would be optimal. In other fringe credit markets, we have extensive
data on the demographics of customers. The Federal Reserve's Survey
of Consumer Finances, for instance, asked households about payday loan
use for the first time in 2007, generating a nationally representative sam-
ple of borrower information.91 Similarly, the FDIC National Survey of
Unbanked and Underbanked Households asks whether households have
used many other alternative financial services, but does not address title
loans in their questions.92 Thus, in the title lending context, no similar re-
sources for demographic data exist.
Prior work focusing on the demographics of title lending customers
has been limited both in its approach to the issue and the factors it con-
sidered. Nathalie Martin and Ernesto Longa summarize prior work on
the demographics of title lending customers in a recent article.93 The two
main studies they discuss are one by Nathalie Martin and Ozymandias
Adams from 2012 that found, using data from regulators in New Mexico,
that "the average title loan borrower in New Mexico makes between
$ 20,116 and $ 27,719,"' 9 and one by the state of Illinois which concluded
that in 1999-2000, "title loan customers in Illinois earn an average of
$ 19,808." 9' But, beyond information about customers' income in two
states, these studies do not offer a rich picture of who title lending cus-
tomers are.
Martin and Longa also discuss geographical studies that find that ti-
tle lenders are more likely to open stores in "low-income neighborhoods
with moderate poverty, where a large percentage of the residents are
members of racial/ethnic minority groups, young or elderly, or recent
immigrants ... [and where m]any residents ... also lack a high school di-
90. U.C.C. § 9-609 (2001).
91. Bucks et al., supra note 16, at A47.
92. FDIC SURVEY, supra note 17, at 29. The other alternative financial services are non-bank
money orders, check cashing, or remittances, payday loans, pawnshops, rent-to-own stores, and refund
anticipation loans.
93. Martin & Longa, supra note 22, at 550.
94. Id. (citing Martin & Adams, supra note 29, at 76, 77, Tables 12-12.1).
95. Id. (citing ILLINOIS DEP'T OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, CONSUMER CREDIT DIVISION,
SHORT TERM LENDING: FINAL REPORT 26, available at http://www.idfpr.com/dfi/ccd/pdfs/Short
erm.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2014)).
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ploma."9 The data from these studies, however, are not about title lend-
ing exclusively but include payday lenders, check cashing stores, and oth-
er lenders, making it difficult to know which findings are relevant to title
lending stores in particular.9
In addition, Todd Zywicki has published a series of articles based
primarily on interviews with title lenders.98 Zywicki argues that title
lending customers fall into three groups: moderate income customers
with impaired credit histories, lower income customers, and small busi-
ness owners.99 Our work differs fundamentally from Zywicki's because
our empirical strategy involves gaining information directly from cus-
tomers and not from lenders' perceptions of customers. We also obtain a
wider variety of information about customers than Zywicki.
Our survey offers the first detailed look at the demographics of title
lending customers, supplementing the information reported in prior
work and, for the first time, addressing more directly some of the key
demographic categories, such as education level, gender, and race. Sum-
mary statistics for several of the measures are presented in Table 1. We
also provide data on the population of the states in which we surveyed
customers, where applicable, so that we can compare the proportion of
each subpopulation of title lending customers to the same subpopulation
in the general population in the state.00
96. See id. at 552 (citing Robin A. Prager, Determinants of the Locations of Payday Lenders,
Pawnshops and Check-Cashing Outlets, FED. RES. BD., 3, 21 (2009), available at http://www.federal
reserve.gov/pubs/feds/2009/200933/200933pap.pdf.).
97. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. APGAR JR. & CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT, U.S. DEP'T HOUSING &
URBAN DEV., SUBPRIME LENDING AND ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS: A
LITERATURE REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T HOUSING & URBAN DEV. xi, available
at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/sublending.pdf (describing the alternative financial service
providers the authors studied as including "check cashing outlets, payday lenders, pawnshops, title
lenders, tax refund anticipation lenders, small loan firms, and rent-to-own stores").
98. See e.g., Todd Zywicki, Consumer Use and Government Regulation of Title Pledge Lending,
22 Loy. CONS. L. REV. 425 (2010) [hereinafter Zywicki, Consumer Use]; Todd J. Zywicki, Money to
Go, 33 REG. 32 (2010) [hereinafter Zywicki, Money to Go]; Todd Zywicki & Gabriel Okolski, Poten-
tial Restrictions on Title Lending, 62 MERCATUS ON POL'Y 1 (2009).
99. Zywicki, Consumer Use, supra note 98, at 426.
100. We obtained data about the population of each state from the U.S. Census Bureau. Ameri-
can Fact Finder, Georgia UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/
nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (insert "Georgia" into the "Community Facts" search box, and select "Go")
(last visited Mar. 25, 2013); American Fact Finder, Idaho, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://fact
finder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (insert "Idaho" into the "Community Facts" search
box, and select "Go") (last visited Mar. 25, 2014); American Fact Finder, Texas, UNITED STATES
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml (insert "Texas" into the
"Community Facts" search box, and select "Go") (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
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TABLE 1: AGE, GENDER, AND RACE OF TITLE LENDING BORROWERS
Full Texas Idaho Georgia
Sample Borrowers State- Borrowers State- Borrowers State-wide wide wide
Median
Age 40 42.6 33.6 38.6 34.6 43 35.3
Male 41.56% 47.30% 49.60% 39.70% 50.10% 36.89% 48.90%
White 57.78% 42.68% 80.90% 74.87% 93.90% 46.15% 63.20%
Black 17.78% 28.57% 12.20% 0.50% 0.80% 35.58% 31.00%
Hispanic 15.56% 20.41% 38.10% 14.07% 11.50% 11.54% 9.10%
Asian 0.67% 1.36% 4.00% 0.50% 1.30% 0.00% 3.40%_
Other 7.56% 1 6.12% 9.55% 5.77%
Two +
races 0.67% 0.68% 1.70% 0.50% 2.10% 0.96% 1.80%
A. Sex
As Table 1 indicates, we find that 41.56% of borrowers surveyed are
male, meaning that women are slightly more likely than men to use auto
title loans. This finding is similar to the demographics for other alterna-
tive financial services. Women are also more likely to use payday
loans, 1 1 pawnshops, 10 2 and rent-to-own services. 103
A variety of explanations have been offered for why women are
more likely than men to use alternative financial service providers. First,
men may be less likely to admit that they are experiencing financial need,
leaving their wife or partner to seek financing. 10 4 Second, women may
seek loans from title lenders because they bear more financial responsi-
bility for children, and they are more likely to declare bankruptcy than
men.1 5 But, because our survey captured responses from people both
originating loans and making payments on loans, it could be simply that
more women were making the payments on loans that were cosigned
with a man.
101. Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy? 5, 7 (Van-
derbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 11-13, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract id= %201266215.
102. Marieke Bos et al., The Pawn Industry and Its Customers: The United States and Europe 5 n.3
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 12-26, 2012) (finding "women make up
55 percent of pawnshop borrowers").
103. JAMES M. LACKO ET AL., FED. TRADE COMM'N BUREAU OF ECON., SURVEY OF RENT-TO-
OWN CUSTOMERS 38 Table 3.2 (2000) [hereinafter FTC SURVEY] (reporting 5.2% of women in the
researchers' sample group had used rent-to-own services in the last five years whereas only 4.5% of
men had).
104. Robert W. Johnson & Dixie P. Johnson, Pawnbroking in the U.S.: A Profile of Customers,
CREDIT RESEARCH CENTER SCHOOL OF BUSINESS GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY WASHINGTON D.C.
37,41 (1998).
105. ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE Two-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-
CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 160-62 (2003).
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B. Race
Rows 3 through 7 in Table 1 present our racial statistics. The major-
ity of borrowers are white, at 57.78%. The next most highly represented
group is African-Americans at 17.78%, followed by Hispanics at 15.56%.
7.56% of borrowers identified as "Other," while less than one percent of
borrowers were Asian (.67%) or two or more races (.67%). There are
also large differences between states. Columns 3-8 of Table 1 break
down the survey results by state. For example, Idaho has a significantly
higher proportion of white borrowers than either Texas or Georgia.
Some commentary criticizes title loans by arguing that title lending com-
panies target minorities. 10 6 Others, however, claim that minorities do not
use fringe credit products at a rate higher than whites after controlling
for income.10
7
Comparing our survey results to the overall state populations shows
that some minority groups are overrepresented among title lending cus-
tomers as compared to the general population. In Georgia, only 31% of
the state population is black, while nearly 36% of the borrowers in our
survey classified themselves as black. In Texas, almost 30% of our bor-
rowers are black, while only 12% of the state population is black. On the
other hand, only 20% of borrowers in Texas are Hispanic, compared
with 38% of the population. And in each survey state, Asians are un-
derrepresented in our borrowers. We did not ask any questions about
income, so we cannot control for any income effects. It is possible that if
we controlled for the borrowers' income, the rate of use would not be
different in a statistically significant way.
We can also compare the number of minorities using title loans to
numbers of the same subpopulation using other alternative financial ser-
vice (AFS) providers. Table 2 compares our full sample to the people
who use two other alternative financial services, payday loans and rent-
106. For only a few of many examples, see URIAH KING ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, RACE MATTERS: THE CONCENTRATION OF PAYDAY LENDERS IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN
NEIGHBORHOODS IN NORTH CAROLINA 2 (Mar. 22, 2005), available at http://www.responsiblelending.
org/north-carolina/nc-payday/research-analysis/racematters/rr006-Race-Matters-Payday in NC-0305.
pdf (finding "that North Carolina payday lending storefronts are disproportionately located in Afri-
can-American neighborhoods"); Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of
Credit: Preserving the Social Safety Net of Informality in Small-Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. REV.
1217, 1218-19 (2004) ("Black Americans experience a number of problems in their efforts to obtain
and use credit. Of particular concern is their vulnerability to so-called 'predatory lenders.' . . . Exam-
ples of targeted consumers include women, minorities, low-income wage earners, and senior citizens.
The chief objects of criticism are financial firms that conduct business in what is variously known as
the subprime, secondary, fringe, or alternative market, including payday lenders, car title pawn opera-
tors, small loan and mortgage companies, rent-to-own stores, check cashing outlets, and rapid refund
tax services.") (footnotes omitted).
107. Donald P. Morgan & Kevin J. Pan, Do Payday Lenders Target Minorities?, FED. RES. BANK
N.Y. (Feb. 8, 2012), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/02/do-payday-lenders-target-
minorities.html (finding that blacks and Hispanics do use payday loans more often than whites but
concluding that "once we control for financial characteristics -such as past delinquency, debt-to-
income ratios, and credit availability, blacks and Hispanics are not significantly more likely than whites
to use payday credit").
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to-own stores, as well as people who have used any alternative financial
services in the past month (not including title loans).
TABLE 2: RACE OF USERS OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL
SERVICES0 8
All AFS (usedTitle loans Payday loans Rent-to-own in past month)
White 57.78% 57% 57.30% 43.10%
Black 17.78% 30% 31.40% 29.10%
Hispanic 15.56% 8% 8.40% 23.50%
Asian 0.67% 3% 2.00% 2.00%
Other 7.56% 2.70% 2.200%
Two+ races 0.67%
As Table 2 indicates, we found there were fewer black and Hispanic
individuals among title loan customers compared to users of other fringe
credit products. Given the large Caucasian population in Idaho, howev-
er, these results might not be generalizable. In addition, black and His-
panic individuals own cars at lower rates than white individuals, 09 which
may explain the difference as compared to other fringe credit products.
C Age
The median age of the title lending borrowers in our survey was 40
years old. In other fringe lending contexts, borrowers are much more
likely to be younger. For instance, the FTC found that 51% of rent-to-
own customers were between 18 and 34 years old. 10 Similarly, 52.49% of
pawnshop customers in Florida and 38.15% of those in Texas were be-
tween 18 and 34, with 82.81% in Florida and 71.32% in Texas being
younger than 45.1 Younger people may be more likely to seek credit
from alternative financial service providers because they do not have the
established credit and income histories to qualify for mainstream credit,
so it is remarkable that title lending customers are older.112  The most
108. Rent-to-own data from FTC SURVEY, supra note 103, at 41 Table 3.3; Payday loan data from
Martin & Longa, supra note 22, at 534 (citing Payday Loan Demographic Study-December 2010,
ONLINE PAYDAY LOANS (Dec. 4, 2010), http://www.online-payday-loans.org/articles/demographics-
december-2010/); all other data from FDIC SURVEY, supra note 17, at Box 6.
109. Robert D. Bullard, Addressing Urban Transportation Equity in the United States, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183, 1191 (2004) ("Nationally, only 7% of white households do not own a car,
compared with 24% of African American households, 17% of Latino households, and 13% of Asian-
American households.").
110. FTC SURVEY, supra note 103, at 32.
111. See Bos et al., supra note 102, at 21 Table 5.
112. AARP PUB. POL'Y INST., A PORTRAIT OF OLDER UNDERBANKED AND UNBANKED
CONSUMERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 57 (2010), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rg
center/ppilecon-sec/underbank-economic-full-092110.pdf; see also Kelly J. Noyes, Get Cash Until Pay-
day! The Payday-Loan Problem in Wisconsin, 2006 WiS. L. REV. 1627, 1633 ("Payday-loan consumers
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likely explanation for this observation is that, unlike in other fringe credit
transactions, title lending customers must typically own a vehicle outright
to take out a title loan.
D. Occupation
We also asked about the borrowers' occupations. The results of this
question are presented in Tables 3 and 4. The first table summarizes the
answers we received based on the options we presented, whereas the
second classifies the occupations according to the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics (BLS) Major Occupation Group classification system.113 We pre-
sent the second table because almost 30% of borrowers chose "Other" as
their occupation. Of those borrowers, however, 84.5% wrote in their oc-
cupation.
TABLE 3: OCCUPATION OF BORROWERS
Full sample Texas Idaho Georgia
Self-employed 17.01% 19.86% 11.34% 23.76%
Construction 6.58% 6.16% 8.76% 2.97%
Sales 7.94% 9.59% 7.22% 0%
Education 3.17% 3.42% 4.64% 6.93%
Healthcare 12.02% 12.33% 14.95% 5.94%
Hotel/Food
Services 11.11% 6.850% 11.340% 16.830%
Other 29.25% 30.82% 27.32% 30.69%
Once we classify our borrowers according the BLS Major Occupa-
tion Groups, we are able to describe the employment of 86% of our bor-
rowers.
1 4
also tend to be young adults: 62% of payday-loan customers in Colorado were between the ages of
twenty and twenty-nine.").
113. This is the highest level of the classification systems used by BLS to study compensation and
by the Census to identify the occupations of Americans in the American Community Survey. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY-WAGES, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., http://
www.bls.gov/ocsm/commain.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
114. Note that the percentage of self-employed individuals decreased because some people who
chose self-employed wrote in what field they work in, effectively putting them into another job cat-
egory.
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TABLE 4: JOBS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO THE BLS MAJOR
OCCUPATION GROUPS
Percentage
Professional, technical, and related 5.96%
Executive, administrative, and managerial 2.65%
Sales 9.93%
Administrative support 1.770%
Precision production 1.10%
Machine operators 3.75%
Transportation and materials moving 4.19%
Handlers, equipment cleaners, helpers, and laborers 6.40%
Service occupations 21.63%
Self-employed 15.890%
No job 13.02%
Not classified 13.69G%
Our results in Table 3 based on the category chosen by the borrow-
ers shows that 15.89% of our sample was self-employed, compared with
6.2% of the general population in the 2011 Census that identified as
"self-employed in own not incorporated business."1 5 This finding is sig-
nificant because past commentary on the industry has argued that title
loans could serve as an important (and perhaps the only) source of credit
for some self-employed people.116 Any regulatory intervention into title
lending markets should weigh the costs of denying access to credit to
these individuals. One cost of prohibiting title loans, for instance, is that
these small businesses may be unable to obtain credit elsewhere.
Interestingly, we find that 13.02% of our borrowers did not have a
job at the time they took the survey. This includes people who identified
as housewives or stay-at-home mothers (16 borrowers), as retired or on
disability (33), as students (4), and as unemployed (3). For the portion of
the jobless borrowers with no income stream, i.e., without family mem-
bers or entitlement programs supporting them, this finding appears to
confirm industry critics' fears that title lending companies do not evalu-
ate the borrower's ability to repay the debt before making loans.1 1 7 One
caveat of the finding, however, is that only 24 of the unemployed bor-
rowers were originating a loan the day they were surveyed; the other 35
customers could have been visiting the store to make a payment on a
loan for another employed customer.
115. China Layne, Changes in Self-Employment: 2010-2011 American Community Survey Briefs,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbrll-21.pdf.
116. Hawkins, Credit on Wheels, supra note 1, at 544-45; Zywicki, Consumer Use, supra note 98,
at 449.
117. See Hawkins, Credit on Wheels, supra note 1, at 553 54 (collecting arguments).
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E. Educational Attainment
Table 5 presents the educational attainment results from the survey.
52.59% of our customers have at least some college education.
TABLE 5: EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (PERCENTAGE)
Full sample Texas Idaho Georgia
Less than high school
diploma 8.80% 7.43% 7.22% 13.86%
High school diploma 38.60% 28.38% 40.72% 49.5%
Some college 37.92% 43.92% 38.14% 28.71%
College degree 8.58% 13.51% 5.15% 7.92%
Postgraduate 6.09% 6.76% 8.76% 0%
While this may seem low since it implies that almost half of our
sample has at most a high school diploma, it is actually very close to the
national average for educational attainment.118 Thus, our findings are
contrary to the suggestion of Martin and Longa that title lending targets
people with low education.1 9
Also, in comparison to users of other fringe banking products, title
lending customers are relatively well educated. 73% of rent-to-own cus-
tomers had no more than a high school diploma in the FTC's survey,120
and over 15% of customers who used any alternative financial service
had less than a high school diploma in the FDIC Survey.2
F. Use of Other Financial Service Products
We asked customers to identify other financial products they use.
The answers to this question can inform several significant policy de-
bates. First, one concern that commentators favoring regulatory inter-
vention express about users of fringe credit is whether they have access
to mainstream financial products and services.2 Our survey can help us
understand the extent to which title lending customers are outside of the
mainstream banking system. Second, commentary that is critical of pro-
hibiting fringe credit products argues that borrowers who cannot use one
type of alternative financial service will simply substitute another prod-
118. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau in 2011. Population 18 and older-56.24%, population 25
and older-56.86%. Educational Attainment in the United States: 2011 - Detailed Tables, UNITED
STATES CENSUS BUREAU Table X, http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2011/
tables.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).
119. Martin & Longa, supra note 22, at 552.
120. FTC SURVEY, supra note 103, at 32.
121. FDIC SURVEY, supra note 17, at 75.
122. See generally Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. REG. 121 (2004) (describing the
difficulties people without bank accounts face and suggesting policies to increase bank utilization
rates).
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uct that is less efficient.123 Our study can shed light on the extent to
which title lending borrowers already actively participate in other credit
transactions.
We asked borrowers what other financial services they used at least
once in the past year. The results are summarized in Table 6.'24
TABLE 6: OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES USED
Percentage
Checking account 56.670%
Payday loan 16.44%
Check cashing 10.44%
Credit card 18.890%
Prepaid credit card 8.67%
Pawnshop 11.33%
Rent-to-own 4.00%
Borrow from friends or family 13.11%
Personal loan from bank 3.11%
None 10.44%
N 450
Over 40% of our borrowers have not used a checking account in the
past year, suggesting that they are unbanked .1 2  Less than 20% have used
a credit card in the past year. The title loan customers we surveyed were
more likely to be unbanked than other fringe credit users. Rent-to-own
customers reported having credit cards (48.4%) and checking accounts
(67.5 %) at higher rates than the title loan customers. 126 Similarly, payday
loan customers must write a postdated check in order to obtain a loan, so
they need to have a checking account. 127  Given the general belief that
people outside of the mainstream banking system are more vulnerable, 128
this finding raises concerns about title lending customers.
123. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 886 95; Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit
Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79, 98 99 (2002). But see Angela Littwin, Testing the Substitution Hypothesis:
Would Credit Card Regulations Force Low-Income Borrowers into Less Desirable Lending Alterna-
tives?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 403, 403 (arguing that insufficient data support the substitution hypothe-
sis).
124. Because borrowers were asked to choose all they have used, the percentages sum to more
than 100%.
125. Because a checking account is the most basic account a person can open at a bank, it is likely
that people who do not have a checking account also do not have other bank accounts.
126. FTC SURVEY, supra note 103, at 45 Table 3.5.
127. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 857. The website Payday Loan Ranger advertises
payday loans for borrowers without a checking account, but this is highly unusual in the industry. Get-
ting A Payday Loan Without Bank Account, PAYDAY LOAN RANGER, https://www.paydayloanranger.
com/PaydayLoan Without BankAccount.php (last visited).
128. See generally Barr, supra note 122 (analyzing how low-income communities are affected by
market imperfections including having less access to alternative forms of credit).
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G. Use of the Loan Proceeds
In our survey, we also asked customers "Why did you take out this
title loan?" This allows us to determine whether consumers are using ti-
tle loans to meet unexpected financial or consumption shocks or are us-
ing them for normal, expected expenses. If consumers use the loans for
unexpected shocks, then title loans perform the important function of
smoothing consumption for people who may not have access to tradi-
tional consumer lending institutions.129 If, on the other hand, consumers
are using the loans to cover normal, anticipated expenses, this may show
either a lack of self-control or uncontrolled financial distress.130
We also explicitly asked whether the loan is for business expenses.
Since automobiles are often one of a person's largest assets, title loans
may provide important financing for self-employed borrowers, as we
point out above."' Prohibiting title loans would shut down what may be
one of the only sources of business credit available for individuals with-
out established borrowing histories with banks. We present the survey
results on this question in Table 7.
TABLE 7: REASON FOR TAKING OUT THE LOAN
Percentage
Business expense 6.00%
Rent/mortgage 20.00%
Medical 7.78%
Gift 13.33%
Utilities 18.673%
Car Repair 17.11%
Education 3.33%
Other 37.78%
N 450
Our results show that only a small proportion of borrowers were us-
ing the loan for business expenses. Only 6% of the borrowers listed
"business expenses" as a reason for taking out the loan. Our survey can-
not address the question of whether this is the only source of business
credit available for these borrowers, but it seems like business credit is
not a significant portion of the loans.
129. In economic terms, consumption smoothing means spreading the effects of any negative
shocks over a long period of time rather than over a short period of time. The desire to smooth con-
sumption is an important assumption of all standard economic models of consumer behavior. It is also
supported by empirical evidence. See, e.g., Martin Browning & Thomas F. Crossley, The Life-Cycle
Model of Consumption and Saving, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2001) (discussing the life cycle model
framework in economics).
130. See infra Part V.B. on self-control issues in behavioral economics.
131. See Zywicki, Consumer Use, supra note 98, at 426.
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Just under a quarter of borrowers used the loan for medical expen-
ses or car repairs, which we believe are most likely to be "emergency"
expenses.132 In these cases, title loans can serve an important economic
purpose of allowing people to spread out the effects of unexpected ex-
penses over a longer period of time. Other reasons, like rent or mort-
gage payments and education expenses, are more likely to be normal ra-
ther than emergency expenses. Twenty-three percent of borrowers
selected these reasons. For these borrowers, it is harder to argue that the
loans serve this consumption smoothing purpose. "Gifts" was quite large,
at almost 14%, but we believe this result is because of the timing of our
survey. The surveys were administered in late November and December,
so we believe that this number would be lower at another time of the
year.
Unfortunately, a significant number of borrowers selected "Other"
and did not write down the reason why they took out the loan. For these
borrowers, we cannot evaluate their reasons for taking out the loan.
H. Borrowers' Means of Getting to Work
Many opponents of title lending argue that borrowers who are una-
ble to repay the loan will lose their vehicles, and, because of that loss, are
at a higher risk of losing their jobs.133 For borrowers to lose their jobs as
a result of taking out a title loan, two things must occur. First, customers
must lose their vehicles through repossession. Our results show that this
does not occur frequently. The regulatory data for Idaho and Texas
place the repossession rates per new loan (not per rollover) in both states
under ten percent.1 4 Second, after losing the vehicle, borrowers must
have no other way to get to work. To address this second condition,
question 3 of our survey asks, "If you lost the vehicle that you used to get
your loan, how would you get to work?" If most consumers would not
have another way to get to work, this would confirm fears that the loss of
the vehicle has dire consequences for borrowers' employment. On the
other hand, if most borrowers do have another way of getting to work, it
may not cause any disruption in employment.
132. Other expenses, like utilities, could also be emergency expenses, if, for example, the utility
bill was unexpectedly high one month, but we cannot distinguish between unexpectedly large bills and
normal, expected bills with our question.
133. This argument is ubiquitous in the literature discussing title lending and in policy statements
about title lending. For a few examples, see 146 CONG. REC. H5181 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (state-
ment of Rep. Mascara); Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of Structure and Cul-
ture, 7 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 323, 332 (2006); Jeff Peterson, Predatory Lending: Profile & Analysis,
ARIZ. RURAL POLICY INST., N. ARIZ. UNIV. 5 (Aug., 8, 2007), http://franke.nau.edu/images/uploads/
rpi/predatory-lending_080807.pdf.
134. See supra Parts II.A and II.C (discussing Idaho's and Texas' regulatory reports).
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TABLE 8: OTHER TRANSPORTATION TO WORK
Percentage
(n=451)
Do not work outside the home 11.97%
Use public transportation 12.86%
Use another vehicle I own 41.24%
Walk to work 10.42%
Get rides from friends/family 15.96%
Buy a new car 4.88%
No other way to work 14.86%
Our results show that, in fact, most workers would have another
way to get to work. Table 8 presents these results. 13 5 Over 40% of bor-
rowers reported that they would use another car that they or their family
owns. Interestingly, 4.88% stated that they would buy another car if they
lost the one used to collateralize the loan.136 Less than 15% of borrowers
stated that they would have no other way to get to work. While not in-
significant, this small percentage suggests that the dire consequences that
critics predict are unlikely to occur for the vast majority of title borrow-
ers. Rough calculations would place the percentage of title borrowers
who lose their jobs as a result of title lending at 1.5%.137
With this demographic information, we have a fuller understanding
of who title lending customers are. But, merely knowing their character-
istics is insufficient as we consider how to best regulate the industry. We
next turn to what our survey tells us about how these customers behave.
V. THE BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS OF TITLE LENDING
"Behavioral economics increases the explanatory power of econom-
ics by providing it with more realistic psychological foundation .... Of-
ten these departures are not radical at all because they relax simplifying
assumptions that are not central to the economic approach." '138 As
Camerer and Lowenstein succinctly note, the field of behavioral econom-
ics consists, for the most part, of relatively minor deviations from a very
135. Because customers were instructed to select all that apply, the percentages sum to more than
100%.
136. We did not ask any questions about income or wealth, so these customers may not actually
be capable of purchasing another vehicle.
137. This would assume that having one's car repossessed and losing one's job if one's car is re-
possessed are independent. In that case, if 10% of customers have their cars repossessed, and 15% of
those customers have no other way to work, then only 1.5% of customers would lose their jobs be-
cause of title lending. This is likely not the case, since a borrower whose car is repossessed probably
has lower wealth and income than a borrower whose car is not repossessed, and is therefore probably
more likely to lack another way of getting to work. The percentage is therefore probably somewhere
between our 1.5% figure and the repossession rate in the state.
138. Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3,3 (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004).
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strict traditional notion of decision making. Though these changes are
often small, such relaxations of the assumption constraining traditional
economic thought can vastly improve upon economists' understanding of
decision making in a number of contexts. As we argue below, behavioral
economics helps us better understand consumers in the title lending
market, and more importantly, can help frame policy solutions to what is
a new, rapidly changing market.
Microeconomics has a workhorse model (which Camerer and
Loewenstein allude to) that economists use to understand and predict
behavior of consumers and other decision makers. This assumes people
act rationally and do not make mistakes when it is at all costly to do so.139
Like any theoretical model of human behavior, this rational-actor model
is a caricature of real decision making and often grossly simplifies actual
behavior. 140 That being said, this and other models provide useful in-
sights into decision making in a number of contexts, and the rational ac-
tor model has come to define modern microeconomics.1 41
In this model's basic form, people maximize a "utility function" at
every point in time.142 A utility function is a way to quantify happiness or
well-being, which is called "utility" in economics. The basic idea is that
people (e.g., consumers making financial decisions) pick the option that
will make them the best off from the available options. Of course these
decisions are often made in the face of uncertainty: I will take the surface
roads because I expect there to be heavy traffic. This maximizes one's
utility ex ante. It may have been the case that taking the highway would
have been better, but given the information on hand at that time (Google
Maps said there was a red line on the highway), the driver made the ra-
tional choice.
Decision makers in this rational decision-making framework can be
characterized as possessing the following qualities:14 1 (1) they have access
to all of the existing, relevant information to inform their choices, (2)
they use that information appropriately and in accordance to the laws of
probability, (3) they respond to prices, and (4) they have "fixed, well-
defined preferences. 1 44 These "preferences" are what make up a utility
function and are assumed to be purely selfish and self-serving (no caring
139. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 153 (1976).
140. For more on how "all models are wrong" and general tips on modeling in economics and
behavioral economics, see generally, Matthew Rabin, Professor of Economics, Univ. of Cal. Berkeley,
Lecture at American Economics Association Meeting (Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Rabin Lecture].
141. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 17 39 (1995) (discussing con-
sumer choice).
142. See Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on Measurement of Utility, 4 REV. OF ECON. STUDIES 155,
156 (1937) ("During any specified period of time, the individual behaves so as to maximise the sum of
all future utilities, they being reduced to comparable magnitudes by suitable time discounting.").
143. This is only a bare bones delineation of the model's assumptions. For more on what the tra-
ditional microeconomic model assumes, see ANDREAU MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 141, at 40-91.
144. See Dan Ariely et al., "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves without Stable Prefer-
ences, 118 Q. J. ECON. 73, 103 (2003) (discussing coherent preferences in depth). Preferences would
not be well-defined if, for example, arbitrary information affected people's willingness to pay for a
good, or irrelevant choices affected people's decision processes. Id. at 102.
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for other people, altruism, reciprocity, etc.). 145 This model has come to
proliferate in law and economics and in legal analysis as well.1 46
In the context of title lending, a rational borrower considering using
a title loan would (1) gather a sufficient amount of information about the
loan and its prices, (2) accurately understand the terms of the loan (APR,
fees, repossession policies, etc.), (3) gather information about alternative
sources of credit, and (4) use the laws of probability to calculate the
chances by which he would be able and unable to repay his loan. These
probabilities would be based on a number of uncertain factors: income,
regular expenses (rent for example), and unexpected expenses (doctor
visits, etc.). The rational model even predicts that consumers would have
rational expectations about these uncertain expenses; borrowers do not
need to predict the future perfectly, but they need to (under the rational
model) have an accurate understanding of the underlying distribution of
changes to spending they could face. That is, they know the likelihood of
experiencing a good or bad "shock," and they plan their behavior, saving
and spending according to those likelihoods. Further, under the rational
model, consumers would have rational expectations about the probabil-
ity of having their car repossessed. With that probability in mind, they
would weigh the options of taking the loan or not taking the loan.
Despite its prominence, there is overwhelming evidence from both
psychology and economics against many of the assumptions that go into
the rational actor model.1 47 Enter behavioral economics. This field main-
tains most of the primary elements of the rational actor model of deci-
sion making, but alters it to incorporate psychological evidence concern-
ing how humans actually behave in real life. For example, we know that
the way decisions are presented or "framed" to consumers can dramati-
cally affect choices.1 48  Furthermore, people seem to evaluate potential
losses in utility in a way that is inconsistent with the traditional rational
model.1 49 People are, of course, not purely self-interested,150 people pro-
crastinate,151 people's preferences are often unstable and incoherent ,152
145. Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners, 9 J. OF
ECON. PERSP. 209, 218 (1995).
146. Christine Jells et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1471-79 (1998).
147. On deviations from time consistency, see George Loewenstein & Drazen Prelec, Anomalies
in Intertemporal Choice: Evidence and an Interpretation, 107 Q.J. ECON. 573, 574-78 (1992). On non-
selfish behavior, see Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with Simple
Tests, 117 Q. J. ECON. 817 (2002). On framing effects, see examples in Camerer & Lowenstein, supra
note 138, at 3, 3-51. On misprediction of preferences, see Norbert Schwartz & Fritz Strack, Reports of
Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental Processes and Their Methodological Implications, in WELL-BEING:
THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 62, 63 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999).
148. Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287,
305 n.25 (1996).
149. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
150. Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON.
REV. 1281, 1281 (1993).
151. Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Choice and Procrastination, 116 Q.J. ECON. 121, 121
(2001).
152. Ariely et al., supra note 144, at 74.
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and people misunderstand and miscalculate when thinking about proba-
bilities and other complicated math problems required by utility maximi-
zation.153
Given the mountain of evidence that people are not purely rational,
especially when it comes to borrowing and saving behavior, we argue
that borrowers in the title lending market are unlikely to follow the ra-
tional model of behavior. Below we summarize the relevant literature
and then explain which anomalies are most relevant in this market and
how they play out. We argue that borrowers are, for the most part,
weighing perceived costs and benefits rationally. They may be, however,
mispredicting their ability to repay the loan. People seem to think they
will be able to repay (i.e., save in between when loan payments are do)
more aggressively than they do. This misprediction may be due to mis-
perceiving costs incurred in the intervening periods between loan pay-
ments, or it may be due to overoptimism about one's own future behav-
ior.
Sections A, B, and C outline these psychological factors as they re-
late to title lending. In each case, we demonstrate how title lending cus-
tomers likely underestimate the true cost of title loans.
A. Optimism and Overconfidence
Overoptimism 15 4 and the closely-related overconfidence 55 are well-
documented behavioral anomalies. 56 Nobel prize-winning psychologist
Daniel Kahneman notes, "people tend to be overly optimistic about their
relative standing on any activity in which they do moderately well." 5 A
classic example of this is that the vast majority of drivers (ninety-three
percent) think they are better at driving than the median driver. 58 Of
course, since "median" means the point at which half of people are
above and half are below, it is not mathematically possible that ninety-
153. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974).
154. See Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence
and the Market's Reaction, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 20, 21 22 (2008) (discussing the impact of overoptimism on
mergers and acquisitions); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (discussing people's unrealistic optimism about future
events).
155. Don A. Moore & Samuel A. Swift, The Three Faces of Overconfidence in Organizations, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONS 147,147-49 (David De Cremer et al. eds., 2011).
156. It may even be "rational" in that depressed people are the most precise about their abilities
and people may be overoptismitic for evolutionary reasons. See Lauren B. Alloy & Lyn. Y. Abram-
son, Judgment of Contingency in Depressed and Nondepressed Students: Sadder but Wiser?, 108 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 441, 461, 468 (1979) ("Depressed people accurately detect noncontingency
between their responses and outcomes whereas non-depressed people ... showed more pronounced
illusions of control in situations in which they were attempting to obtain desired outcomes ...").
People may also be overoptimistic for evolutionary reasons. See TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS:
A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY POSITIVE BRAIN 14 (2012) (" [O]ur brains can often provide us with a
distorted sense of reality.").
157. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 260 (2011).
158. Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981).
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three percent of people are better drivers than the median driver. Even
accounting for differences in the varying definitions of a "good driving,"
most respondents are overconfident. Overconfidence takes many forms
and people do not seem to easily learn about or adjust their overconfi-
dence.159
In the context of title lending, we might guess that borrowers are
overly optimistic that they will pay their loan on time. Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that consumers similar to those in this market are often
late paying off the loan and take longer to repay than they think they
will. 60
Our results show that customers taking out a loan on the day of the
survey do in fact show signs of overoptimism, however it is not severe.
Table 9 shows the answers to the question "How many months total do
you think it will take to completely pay off this loan (after all renew-
als/rollovers?)" for customers who were taking out a loan on the day of
the survey. The table also includes the information from a required Tex-
as disclosure that shows how long borrowers usually take to pay off their
title loan.1 61 The percentage of people in our sample who thought they
would pay the loan off in two to three months is higher than the general
usage data would imply, and the percentage of people in our sample who
thought it would take six or more months to pay off the loan is too low
compared to the general usage data. This leads us to believe that people
may be overly optimistic about their ability to repay. This could be be-
cause of so-called "consumption shocks" that occur over the borrowing
period: a child gets sick, the utility bill is larger than expected, etc., or it
could be because people have less money in their bank account at the
end of the 30 days than they thought they would-not because of unex-
pected bills but because of unpredicted impatience with savings and
spending, a possibility we discuss next. But overall, the results are not
severe. People are relatively good at predicting their ability to repay,
although there is room for improvement.
159. Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 11, 31 (1998).
160. Lynn Drysdale & Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Market-
place: The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws
in Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 599 (2000).
161. OFFICE OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT COMM'R, FILLABLE AUTO TITLE MULTIPLE PAYMENT
DISCLOSURE (2012), available at http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/industry/CAB/Fillable /20Auto
%20Title%2OMultiple%2OPay%2ODisclosure%20%28Dec%2012%29.pdf. The disclosure form re-
quires a company to provide information on the cost of the loan. It also includes information on how
long borrowers typically take to pay off a title loan. The data for the disclosure are taken from a 2010
Tennessee report on title pledge lending. We refer to the information on months it actually takes
people to pay off the loan as general usage data.
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TABLE 9: PREDICTION OF MONTHS TO COMPLETELY PAY OFF THE
LOAN
gBorrowers'Brrdio s i Texas Disclosure
Predictions in ofAtaUsg
Our Smple of Actual UsageOur Sample
Percentage Percentage
1 month 20.13% 27.00%
2-3 months 37.58% 24.00%
4-5 months 14.09% 13.00%
6+ months 28.19% 36.00%
Total 100% 100%
We would also expect that customers familiar with the title loan
product and their own behavior might learn about themselves and be-
come less overoptimistic over time. The rational model predicts that title
loan customers will learn from their own use of a product with a latent
risk.162 A latent risk is one that is unknown before using the product, but
becomes known through the use of the product or service.163 The more
frequently a title lending customer uses title loans and experiences the
unforeseen risk of multiple rollovers, the more likely the customer is to
begin to foresee that risk and correct overoptimism about repayment. 16 4
Our results show that this type of learning may occur in the title
loan market. Using the same question, "How many months total do you
think it will take to completely pay off this loan (after all renew-
als/rollovers?)," we compare in Table 10 the answers for people taking
out a loan for the first time with the answers for people who had used a
title loan before.165 Fewer people who have used a title loan before think
that they will pay off the loan in one month than people taking out a loan
for the first time do. Similarly, more people who have used title loans in
the past think it will take them six or more months to pay off the loan
than those who have never used one before. Thus, it appears that cus-
tomers do learn about the latent risk of the product or their own behav-
ioral tendencies through using the service.
162. See Bar-Gill, supra note 13, at 755.
163. Seeid. at 755 56.
164. Id. ("Starting with intrapersonal learning, the speed with which a consumer will learn about a
latent risk associated with a product will depend on how frequently she uses the product and how fre-
quently the risk materializes."). See also Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions
Over the Life Cycle with Implications for Regulation 7 (Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Working
Paper 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=973790.
165. This table still only includes customers who were taking out the loan on the day of the
survey.
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TABLE 10: OPTIMISM AND LEARNING
First loan Not first loan
Percentage Percentage
1 month 27.78% 15.79%
2-3 months 38.89% 36.84%
4-5 months 14.81% 13.68%
6+ months 18.52% 33.68%
n 54 95
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Even if people learn about their own behavior and how loans work
through repeated interactions with a title lender, their behavior may not
change over time. People may be persistently "naive" about their future
behavior. We turn to this possibility next.
B. Choice Over Time
First, we must describe the canonical model that economists use to
study tradeoffs over time. Note that nearly every choice has an "inter-
temporal element," that is some costs and benefits that come at different
points in time. For example, choosing to update your iPad software gives
you future benefits of more user-friendly environment, but at the cost of
spending some time to learn those updates before the benefits are
reaped.
Recall that we consider consumers to have a utility function that
represents happiness or well-being. People make choices so as to maxim-
ize that happiness, working with the set of available choices. 166 People
pick and choose, or "trade off," goods subject to having to stay within
their "budget constraint" (loosely, their income and savings). For exam-
ple, I can afford 1 banana and 2 apples or 0 bananas and 3 apples. I quite
like apples, so I will go with the latter.
Just like that simple tradeoff, people trade off "utilities" and "disu-
tilities" (which can be roughly described as bursts or doses of happiness
or unhappiness) over time. People might take a hit to utility (increasing
disutility) today for a future benefit: completing a homework assignment
today creates disutility now but enables the future utility of being able to
attend the Barristers' Ball on Friday night. The costs and benefits in-
volved in a tradeoff can also be reversed. Staying out late with friends on
a Wednesday night could come with the extra disutility of having to cram
all of one's studying into an all-nighter before an exam rather than study-
ing for shorter periods of time spread over the week. These same
tradeoffs affect choices in lending markets: Borrowing $500 today means
big benefits today (increased cash flow) but costs in the future (monthly
interest payments).
166. See supra note 142.
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The rational actor model has precise predictions about how these
tradeoffs over time are weighed. The model says that people weigh how
much (or little) they care about the future, and predict their future
choices in accordance with those weights. If one is a very "patient" per-
son, she might plan do all her homework on Monday, well before it is
due. If someone was relatively "impatient," she might choose to delay a
costly task like homework for some future date. Important to this ra-
tional actor model is that people (whether they be patient or impatient)
accurately predict their future behavior (outside of some major changes
like a blizzard occuring and plans were changed).
Many parts of this model are intuitive: people do seem to tradeoff
costs and benefits over time, and people are more patient when consider-
ing the distant future. The model even allows for there to be differences
across people in their level of patience. This model, however, called
"exponential discounting" is very rigid and can be unrealistic.
Beyond the rigidity of assuming people have precisely the same
level of patience all the time (note this rules out behavior such as "most
of the time I do my homework but once in a while I throw caution to the
wind and stay out all night"), it is unrealistic in that people often mispre-
dict their level of patience "I might be impatient today but tomorrow I
will go on a diet." Note that mispredictions about levels of patience are
considered to be self-control problems by behavioral economists, and the
mispredictions almost universally go in one way: people think they will
have more self-control than they actually do: "I want to start saving for
retirement, but I will work that out next week." "This is my last ciga-
rette." "I want to lose weight, so I really really will start exercising hard,
tomorrow." And so on.
Essentially, all of us procrastinate and have self-control problems
from time to time. But this common sense, all-too-common behavior is
completely at odds with the rational actor model. In fact, the weight of
experimental evidence, and evidence from the real work, and mere
common sense suggest people are "present-biased:" They are impatient
in the short-run, patient when making choices over the longer run, and
further, they mispredict these preferences. Behavioral economists rec-
ognize this reality and have begun to document the important of such
behavior in consumer markets.
Models of "present-biasedness" have been used to understand be-
havior in many areas, including credit markets. Evidence of present-
biasedness has been shown in the context of smoking,167 weight loss, sav-
ing,168 credit cards, payday loans, and pawnshops. Consequently, thinking
about present-biasedness in the world of title lending is obvious.
167. Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Is Addiction "Rational"? Theory and Evidence, 116
Q.J. ECON. 1261, 1293 94 (2001).
168. James J. Choi et al., Plan Design and 401(k) Savings Outcomes (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search Working Paper No. 10486, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10486.pdf.
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Borrowing today means receiving benefits (getting the principal
amount of the loan) now, with costs (having to pay back principal plus
interest payments -potentially very large interest payments) to be in-
curred in the future."' We note that borrowing at high interest need not
necessarily be "irrational." People could be reasonably calculating the
tradeoffs and making choices accordingly. Those tradeoffs would almost
surely be considered "impatient" if we were to calibrate the tradeoffs
empirically. But again, impatience is not irrational. The misprediction of
one's level of patience is. If I need emergency medical treatment now,
the utility I get from obtaining money now by borrowing could be so
large that it is rational for me to borrow at 300% APR to cover the med-
ical expenses.
We posit that just like almost any other market that has been stud-
ied involving consumer choice, borrowers in the title lending market
think they will be patient, saving for the future, and that they will easily
pay off the lender in a timely manner. But under a model of mispredic-
tion of future patience, a borrower, for example, will in the end fail to be
as patient as he expected, and will have a harder time repaying than ex-
pected at the time he took out the loan.
To learn about the levels of patience (or impatience as it were) of
our consumers, we asked them two questions related to their tradeoffs
over time (also called "time preferences").1 70 The first question asked
them to hypothetically choose between receiving $60 today or receiving
$75 in one month as a lottery prize. The second asked them to make a
similar comparison looking six months into the future: choose between
receiving $100 in six months or $125 in seven months. By combining
these two answers, we can determine the basic time preference category
of the borrower. For example, a person who chose to delay payment for
more money in both scenarios would be considered patient, but a person
who chose less money sooner in both scenarios would be deemed impa-
tient. A person who makes the inconsistent choice of impatience in the
first scenario but patience in the second scenario is present-biased be-
cause "the implied discount rate in the near-term frame is higher than
that of the distant frame." 1 Table 11 presents the results of the time
preferences of borrowers.
169. To take a simple example, many students borrow to finance their college education in order
to obtain the benefits of a degree early in life, before they have had a chance to save up enough money
for tuition. They plan to deal with the costs later in life, when they are better situated to pay off the
debt. Borrowing money allows them to "smooth" their consumption over their life course. See
Allison Mann et al., Debt, Bankruptcy, and the Life Course 11 12 (Working Paper, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1492845&download=yes (explaining but also cri-
tiquing this view).
170. These are questions 9 and 10 in our survey instrument. See Appendix A.
171. Nava Ashraf et al., Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment Savings Prod-
uct in the Philippines, 121 Q.J. ECON. 635, 647 (2006).
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TABLE 11: TIME PREFERENCES
Percentage Count
Impatient 30.24% 137
Present bias 19.21% 87
Future bias 13.47% 61
Patient 37.09% 168
Total 100.00% 453
We find that 19% of our borrowers were present-biased. Recall
that this means they think they will be more patient tomorrow than they
are today and will mispredict their willingness to save over the course of
the month to pay off the loan. 30% of borrowers were impatient, mean-
ing that they highly discount the future but are consistent in their
choices. 37% were actually patient, meaning they were not irrational in
their predictions about future discounting, and they were not impa-
tient. 17 2
We think there is more to the story; while a hyperbolic model is a
nice way to more realistically capture certain aspects of decision making,
it can also be quite rigid in itself. It assumes, for example, that people
have the same level of self-control problems in every time period, ruling
out the possibility that someone might be mostly patient but once in a
while throw caution to the wind and, for example, stay out all night par-
tying. 1 3 It also assumes that people understand the inherent risks in a
product or service, but that they misunderstand their own preferences.
Next, we discuss more basic mistakes in decision making, and specific-
ally, rely on limited attention, a very basic, common sense approach to
decision theory, but one that has been relatively new on the scene to em-
pirical behavioral economists.
C. Limited Attention
Several recent papers have used the fact that people have limited at-
tention to explain behavior.174 Many types of decisions are complicated
and involve processing large amounts of information. 1 5 When required
to process a lot of information, people use mental shortcuts or "heuris-
172. See id. at 646 (discussing survey instruments). Other authors have asked borrowers the exact
same questions. For example, Ashraf et al. find that "[a]pproximately 27.5 percent of individuals were
hyperbolic [present-biased], that is more patient over future tradeoffs than current trade-offs, whereas
19.8 percent were less patient over future trade-offs than current trade-offs." Id. at 647. Our results
are similar to theirs.
173. See generally David Huffman & Matias Barenstein, A Monthly Struggle for Self-Control?
Hyperbolic Discounting, Mental Accounting, and the Fall in Consumption Between Paydays (IZA Dis-
cussion Paper No. 1430, 2005), available at http://ftp.iza.org/dp1430-rev.pdf.
174. See, e.g., Josef Falkinger, Limited Attention as a Scarce Resource in Information-Rich Econ-
omies, 118 ECON. J. 1596 (2008).
175. See e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2004) (describing
the complexity of credit card contracts and the ways in which these contracts confuse consumers).
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tics"1"6 to ease the decision-making process. Using heuristics in a context
like subprime lending may narrow one's attention to the attractive-
seeming aspects of the loan that the lender wants to highlight, at the cost
of concealing important facts that may turn out to be detrimental.
Behavioral economists have theoretical models for how people use
their attention. For example, in Gabaix and Laibson's work,1" they show
that many goods are marketed intentionally with "salient" and "shroud-
ed" attributes, for example, a printer that is inexpensive but uses ex-
tremely costly ink."8 Consumers do not, or do not fully, consider the cost
of replacing the ink when purchasing the printer. Another nice example
of work that studies limited attention in a large consumer market (note
that much of the research is from lab experiments) is Lacertal, Pope, and
Sydnor1 9 They use 22 million used car sale transactions to document the
existence of a "left-digit bias"; that is, when shopping for cars, both con-
sumers and dealers assign disproportionate weight to the left-most digits
in the mileage figure (making 49,900 and 50,000 miles appear to be vastly
different mileage figures, for example).80 This is borne out in the pat-
terns of used car auction purchase prices.
In the world of title lending, we think that a few aspects of the
transaction are particularly salient, and some are more shrouded. For
instance, title lending advertising emphasizes the speed at which the cus-
tomer can obtain the cash, 81 the maximum loan amount the lender will
give, 182 the ability of the customer to keep their cars,"' and the conven-
176. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kalneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
177. See Stefano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 315, 348-62 (2009); Dean Karlan et al., Getting to the Top of the Mind: How Reminders
Increase Savings, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16205, 2010).
178. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information
Suppression in Competitive Markets, Q.J. ECON. 505, 506-11 (2006).
179. Nicola Lacetera et al., Heuristic Thinking and Limited Attention in the Car Market, 102 AM.
ECON. R. 2206 (2012).,
180. Id.
181. To obtain a rough sense of the advertising on title lending websites, we viewed the websites
of four prominent title lending companies. See Benefits of a Title Loan with LoanMax, LOANMAX
TITLE LOANS, https://www.loanmaxtitleloans.net/BenefitsOflitleLoan (last visited Mar. 29, 2014) (ad-
vertising "[i]nstant, on-site approvals" and "[s]ame-day loans in 20 minutes or less") [hereinafter
LOANMAX TITLE LOANS Benefits]; Title Loans, ACE CASH EXPRESS, https://www.acecash
express.com/title-loans/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2014) (promising the ability to "[a]pply online or in-store
in just minutes" and "instant approval"); Title Loans Up to $25,000 at the Cash Store, CASH STORE,
http://www.cashstore.com/title-loans (last visited Mar. 29, 2014) ("Title loans are a great lending op-
tion that allow you to get up to $25,000 fast. Through car title loans you can quickly get the money
you need .... ) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter CASHSTORE]; TITLEMAX, http://www.titlemax.biz
(last visited Mar. 29, 2014) ("[I]nstant approval on car title loans, which means you get your cash
fast!").
182. CASH STORE, supra note 181 (allowing $25,000); Frequently Asked Questions - Title Loans,
ACE CASH EXPRESS, https://www.acecashexpress.com/title-loans/faq (last visited Mar. 29, 2014) (al-
lowing $2,500) [hereinafter ACE CASH EXPRESS]; LOANMAX TITLE LOANS, https://www.loanmax
titleloans.net (last visited Mar. 29, 2014)(allowing $10,000); TITLEMAX, supra note 181 (allowing
$10,000).
183. ACE CASH EXPRESS, supra note 182 ("You get the money and you get to keep driving your
car."); CASH STORE, supra note 181 ("Best of all, you get to keep and drive your car while you pay
back the loan!"); LOANMAX TITLE LOANS, supra note 182 ("You keep your car!"); TITLEMAX, supra
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ience of doing business with the company. 184 Title lending advertise-
ments do not generally mention the interest rate of the loans, the likeli-
hood a loan will result in a vehicle being repossessed, or the likely
amount of time it will take for the borrower to repay the debt.8
State and federal disclosure laws require that the loan contracts dis-
close the finance charge and interest rate, but they do not, for the most
part, require that lenders disclose any pattern of usage information to in-
form borrowers about the likely consequences of having taken out a
loan.186 More importantly, laws do not generally require price disclosures
be made upfront-that is before the borrower has invested substantial
effort into obtaining the loan. For instance, Texas' law requires that
lenders provide disclosures at the time the loan is made,187 but the statute
does not require the disclosures any earlier in the process than when the
borrower is signing the final paperwork. Even though loan documents
may have pertinent pricing information and may be short,188 the disclo-
sure of price is shrouded by the timing in which the borrower receives
it. 189
In sum, a mountain of common sense as well as empirical work doc-
uments attention as a scare resource. Lenders are acutely aware of this
phenomenon and without regulatory prodding, will emphasize favorable
transaction terms and shroud unfavorable ones. 190 By shrouding price
terms and the likely ways the borrower will use the loan, lenders are able
to encourage borrowers to underestimate the cost of the title loan.
Each of these behavioral deviations from the rational choice model
suggests that borrowers in title lending markets are underestimating the
true costs of the loans. Some borrowers are overly optimistic about the
speed at which they will repay the debt, some experience self-control
problems that cause them to mispredict their future patience, and others
exhibit limited attention and focus on non-price terms of the transaction.
While none of these suboptimal decisions portray title loans as scandal-
ous, they do indicate a need for laws to correct irrational behavior in this
market.
note 181 ("The best part about getting a car title loan with TitleMax is that you get to keep driving
your car.").
184. Locations, LOANMAX TITLE LOANS, https://www.loanmaxtitleloans.net/Locations (last visit-
ed Mar. 29, 2014) ("[C]onvenient locations!"); TITLEMAX, supra note 181 (touting "over 175 locations
offering title pawns across the state of Georgia").
185. All of the websites in note 180 fail to mention these facts.
186. See supra Part III.
187. TEX. FiN. CODE ANN. § 393.222 (West 2014).
188. See Hawkins, The Federal Government in the Fringe Economy, supra note 45, at 64-65 (de-
scribing Speedy Cash's title loan contract as being around five pages long).
189. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 904 (making a similar observation in the context of
payday lending).
190. Id. at 904-05.
No. 4] 1049
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
We have presented survey evidence that reveals demographic in-
formation about title lending customers and demonstrates how title lend-
ing customers deviate from the theoretical portrait of the rational actor
in systematic, predictable ways. But the question remains: what should
regulators do about this lending product? Our conclusion is to suggest
one type of regulation, product-use disclosures, and to discourage
another, prohibition.
We argue that the primary response to the problem of underesti-
mating the true cost of title loans is behaviorally-informed disclosures. 191
Policymakers should require that title lending companies post infor-
mation about how people actually use title loans: information about the
number of times people rollover their loan, the amount of money these
rollovers cost in total, the number and amount of late fees and other fees
people pay, and the likelihood of defaulting on the loan. Oren Bar-Gill's
recent book, Seduction by Contract, distinguishes between product-
attribute disclosures and product-use disclosures. 192 Product-attribute
disclosures provide information about the product itself, such as a loan's
interest rate or the fee for paying late.1 93 Product-use disclosures, on the
other hand, inform customers about their own probable future use pat-
terns, such as common "[b]orrowing patterns and the incidence of late
payment."1 94 This latter type of disclosure is so important because if title
lending borrowers are likely to make the types of mistakes we identify in
Part V, information about the title loan product's attributes will be insuf-
ficient to ensure the market functions. For instance, if borrowers only
know the loan's APR but are overly optimistic about how long it will
take them to pay off the loan, they will underestimate the cost of the
loan. Similarly, if they are present-biased and mispredict their abilities to
be patient and save to pay off the loan, they will make mistakes about
how long it will take to repay the debt (and ultimately the loan's cost).
Borrowers need to know the likely way they will use the product to
weight its utility.
Lenders can base product-use disclosures on either average-use pat-
terns that focus on how a large group uses a product or individual-use
patterns that focus on how a specific individual has used a product in the
past. 95 While individual-use disclosures are more effective in communi-
cating relevant, believable information to borrowers, they are infeasible
in title lending markets because many borrowers do not have long-term
191. For the origin of this term and its application in the mortgage context, see Michael S. Barr et
al., Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Credit Regulation, in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER
AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 170 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008).
192. OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
CONSUMER MARKETS 33 34 (2012).
193. Id. at 33.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 35.
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relationships with single title lenders.196 Thus, the best option for title
lending disclosures is to see how borrowers generally use the product.
Some work disputes the efficacy of disclosure-based regulations, ar-
guing that disclosure has failed as a regulatory strategy to improve mar-
kets."T Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider, for instance, point to "em-
pirical evidence [to] show that mandated disclosure regularly fails in
practice . 1..."98 While we have to leave the general concerns about dis-
closures to others, there is empirical evidence in fringe consumer credit
markets that product-use disclosures do affect consumer decision mak-
ing. Marianne Bertrand and Adair Morse offered payday lending cus-
tomers four different types of information treatments as the customers
took out payday loans and then measured the effect of the information
on consumer behaviors, operating on the assumption that "if all or a sub-
set of payday borrowers are cognitively impaired, one might expect bor-
rowing behavior to respond to how the costs (and benefits) of the payday
products are being disclosed." '99 One information treatment presented a
graphic depicting how long it takes the average person to pay off a pay-
day loan.200 Bertrand and Morse explain that "this treatment gets bor-
rowers to take a broader look at the payday borrowing decision, and may
therefore also partly undo borrowers' tendency to apply too narrow a
decision frame. '20 1
To assess the effect of the information treatments, they tracked the
behavior of customers subjected to the different treatments and com-
pared each group to a control group and to each other. Based on this
comparison, they conclude that
information that makes people think less narrowly (over time)
about finance costs results in less borrowing. In particular, reinforc-
ing the adding-up dollar fees incurred when rolling over loans re-
duces the take-up of future payday loans by 11% in the subsequent
4 months. 20 2
Following Bertrand and Morse's graphic depiction of patterns of
use, Texas now requires a disclosure statement to be given to any cus-
tomer taking out a title loan that includes information on fees and actual
196. Id. at 35, 107.
197. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 647, 651 (2011) ("Although mandated disclosure addresses a real problem and rests on a plausi-
ble assumption, it chronically fails to accomplish its purpose. Even where it seems to succeed, its costs
in money, effort, and time generally swamp its benefits. And mandated disclosure has unintended and
undesirable consequences, like driving out better regulation and hurting the people it purports to
help."); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 789-90 (2006) ("First, the quantity of disclosures can create an
information overload. Second, they are given at a time when the borrower is no longer in a deci-
sionmaking frame, but is already psychologically committed to the loan and likely to ignore red flags
under the influence of motivated reasoning. Finally, the disclosures reinforce a false sense of security
about the home borrowing process, in part through the representativeness heuristic.").
198. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 197, at 651.
199. Bertrand & Morse, supra note 21, at 1866..
200. Id. at 1872 73.
201. Id. at 1873.
202. Id. at 1865.
No. 4]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
usage patterns of the loan.2 3 The disclosure includes information on the
proportion of people who roll over their loans for two to three months,
four to five months, and six or more months, and the proportion of peo-
ple who do not roll over their loans.204 To look at whether this disclosure
is effective in changing people's beliefs about how they will use the loan,
we must compare the expected number of months to repayment for
Texas borrowers and for borrowers in our other states. Unfortunately,
once we restrict our sample to borrowers taking out the loan on the day
of the survey, we are left with only thirty borrowers from Texas. Our re-
sults, therefore, cannot provide much reliable information on the effec-
tiveness of the disclosure, and we leave this question for further research.
Nevertheless, Bertrand and Morse's work reveals the efficacy of product-
use disclosures in this particular market.
While Texas' disclosure provides some of the information needed to
remove bias from faulty decision-making, the disclosure would be much
more effective if it were posted prominently in the store so that custom-
ers could see the information before incurring the transaction costs in-
volved in applying for the loan.2 5 Requiring title lending companies to
present pattern of use information in their advertising on the Internet
and in stores would maximize the effect the information could have on
borrowers and limit companies' abilities to capitalize on borrowers' lim-
ited attention.
Although we believe policymakers should intervene in the title
lending market in new ways, by requiring creative and prominent prod-
uct-use disclosures, the evidence we obtained through our survey does
not indicate that states (or the federal government) should prohibit title
lending. The primary argument advanced by policymakers for banning
title lending has been that a substantial portion of customers are risking
their livelihood by taking out a loan secured by their vehicle. 20 6 Propo-
nents of this view have admitted that they were uncertain of the evidence
203. The General Counsel of the Texas Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner recently ex-
plained that Texas specifically modeled its payday and title lending disclosure regulation on Bertrand
and Morse's work. Sealy Hutchings & Matthew J. Nance, Credit Access Businesses: The Regulation of
Payday and Title Loans in Texas, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 76,89 (2012).
204. The actual disclosure mandated by the state is available on the Internet, although the form
does not have the loan amounts and fees which the lender fills in. Auto Title Loan-Single Payment,
OFFICE OF CONSUMER CREDIT COMM'R, http://www.occc.state.tx.us/pages/industry/CAB/Fillable
%20Auto%2OTitle%2OSingle%2OPay%2ODisclsoure%20(Dec%2012).pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2014).
205. See supra Part III.c.
206. See Hawkins, Credit on Wheels, supra note 1, at 466 (collecting arguments from policymak-
ers, academics, and consumer advocates). For a few examples, see H.R. CON. RES. 312, 106th Cong.
(2000), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS- 106hconres3l2rfs/pdf/BILLS-1 06hconres3l2
rfs.pdf ("[T]itle loans and title pawns threaten the ability of consumers to hold a job since default on
the loan or pawn will result in repossession and sale of their car, which is often their only means of
transportation to and from work."); DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING
PRACTICES DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 16 (Aug. 9,
2006). available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Report to Congress-final.pdf (suggesting
title loans cause borrowers to lose an essential transportation).
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for this claim,20 but our survey, along with state regulatory reports,
strongly suggest that this concern has been vastly overstated.2 8 State
regulatory reports reveal that only a small minority of borrowers lose
their car to repossession, and the responses to our survey indicate that
only a small minority of those customers that lose a car would be unable
to get to work.
Moreover, some evidence exists that many people are using title
loans in the way the rational actor model would predict, suggesting a
functioning market that could result in welfare maximization.2 9 People
make decent predictions about the total length of time they will pay in-
terest on their loan, so many borrowers are not overly optimistic,210 and
our survey indicates that borrowers exhibit intrapersonal learning as they
use the product over time, ameliorating some of the irrational decision
making.211
Finally, the demographic information our survey uncovered does
not compel radical market intervention. Title lending customers are not,
when compared to the general population, disproportionately members
of racial minority groups, are not exceedingly young or exceedingly old,
and do not lack education. Certainly, some demographic characteristics
do make title lending customers more vulnerable to unscrupulous prac-
tices, such as the fact that many are unbanked and many are self-
employed, which may indicate a lack of access to other sources of credit
that require income. Yet, overall, the picture of title lending customers is
closer to the mainstream of society than prior research argues. Given
these demographic characteristics, the evidence of rational decision mak-
ing, and the vacuity of the argument that a large portion of people will
lose their only way to work, the case for prohibiting title loans is uncon-
vincing.
What is clear is that we are at an opportune moment for legal re-
form. In many ways, the title lending market is unlike its fellow fringe
banking counterparts. Payday loans are essentially uniform across the
country with a set fee for an approximately two week loan. 21 2 Legisla-
tures have taken definitive and concrete action to address the loan prod-
uct. 213 Payday lending companies have organized into a large trade or-
207. Leah Plunkett et al., Baby, You Can Take My Car: The Dangers of Auto Title Loans, NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR. (July 15, 2010), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/conferences and webinars/
auto webinars/recordings/recording-julyl5.wmv.
208. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
209. Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, supra note 175, at 1414.
210. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text. For a detailed study finding that payday
lending customers are accurate in their predictions about how long they will keep out their loans, see
Ronald Mann, Assessing the Optimism of Payday Loan Borrowers (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law
and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 443,), 2013 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract-id=2232954. Specifically, Mann finds that "most borrowers finally repay their loans and
are free of debt within two weeks of the date they predicted on the date of the loan." Id. at 5.
211. See supra Part V.A.
212. See generally, Mann & Hawkins, supra note 14, at 882 (discussing the economics of payday
lending).
213. Id. at 874.
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ganization and set out "best practices" for member stores to follow.2 14
None of these things are true for title loans -the loan products vary from
thirty-day loans to amortized year-long loans, many states have no title-
lending specific laws, and no trade organization represents a significant
portion of the market. Policymakers have a unique opportunity in title
lending markets to use the behaviorally-informed economic analysis in
the Article to ensure a fair, efficient market. Instead of banning title
lending, policymakers should foster a market with information that will
help customers understand the true cost of title loans.
214. CFSA Member Best Practices, CMTY. FIN. SERVS. Assoc. OF AM., http://cfsaa.com/cfsa-
member-best-practices/liveaccid541ll.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
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APPENDIX A
TITLE LENDING CUSTOMER SURVEY
CONTACT: JIM HAWKINS, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON LAW CENTER, 713-
743-5018
PLEASE CIRCLE THE LETTER OF YOUR ANSWER:
1. HOW OFTEN DO YOU TAKE OUT TITLE LOANS?
A. This is my first time
B. Once a year
C. 2-3 times a year
D. 4-6 times a year
E. More than 6 times a year
2. WHY DID YOU TAKE OUT THIS TITLE LOAN? (CIRCLE ALL THAT
APPLY.)
A. Business expenses (anything related to running a business)
B. Rent or mortgage payment
C. Medical Expenses
D. Gifts
E. Utility Bills
F. Car repair
G. Educational Expenses
H. Other
3. IF YOU LOST THE VEHICLE THAT YOU USED TO GET YOUR LOAN, HOW
WOULD YOU GET TO WORK? (CIRCLEALL THATAPPLY.)
A. I do not work outside the home.
B. Use public transportation
C. Use another vehicle I or my family owns to get to work
D. Walk to work
E. Get rides from friends or car pool
F. Buy a new car
G. I would not have another way to get to work
4. HOW MANY MONTHS TOTAL DO YOU THINK IT WILL TAKE TO
COMPLETELY PAY OFF THIS LOAN (AFTER ALL RENEWALSiROLLOVERS)?
A. 7 More than 12
B. 8
C. 9
D. 10
E.11
F. 12
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5. HoW LONG HAVE YOU HAD THIS LOAN OUT?
A. I am taking out the loan today.
B. I have had my loan out for months.
6. WHY DID YOUPICK THIS COMPANY? (CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY.)
A. Price
B. Loan amount
C. Location
D. Referral from someone
E. Lender's reputation
F. I could get the money more quickly here.
G. Repeat Customer
7. WHAT OTHER FINANCIAL SERVICES DID YOU USE AT LEAST ONCE IN
THE PAST YEAR? (CIRCLE ALL THATAPPLY.)
A. Checking account
B. Payday loan
C. Check cashing service
D. Credit card
E. Prepaid credit card
F. Pawnshop
G. Rent-to-own company
H. Borrow from friends or family
I. Personal loan from bank or credit union.
J. None.
8. WE'D LIKE YOU TO IMAGINE THAT YOU HAD A CHOICE BETWEEN ONE
OF TWO JOBS THAT ARE THE SAME, EXCEPT THAT THEY PAY
DIFFERENTLY. WHICH JOB WOULD YOU CHOOSE (PLEASE CIRCLE ONE)?
A. JOB A has a regular paycheck of $300 EVERY WEEK.
B. JOB B requires the same work and hours as Job A, but has a paycheck
that varies. EACH WEEK YOU WOULD HAVE A 50/50 CHANCE OF
GETTING EITHER $250 OR $450 PAY (like a coin flip), but you would nev-
er know ahead of time whether that particular week would be high or
low.
9. IMAGINE YOU WON A LOTTERY AND HAD TO CHOOSE BETWEEN TWO
PAYMENT OPTIONS, WHICH WOULD YOU CHOOSE?
A. OPTION A would give you $60 PAID OUT TODAY
B. OPTION B would give you $75 PAID OUT ONE MONTH FROM TODAY
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10. IMAGINE INSTEAD YOU WON A DIFFERENT LOTTERY (YOU NEVER
WON THE LOTTERY IN THE LAST QUESTION) AND HAD TO DECIDE
BETWEEN ONE OF THESE TWO PAYMENT OPTIONS, WHICH WOULD YOU
CHOOSE?
A. OPTION A would give you $100 PAID OUT 6 MONTHS FROM TODAY
B. OPTION B would give you $125 PAID OUT 7 MONTHS FROM TODAY
11. THIS COMPANY'S CUSTOMER SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES ARE
COURTEOUS AND HELPFUL.
A. Agree.
B. Disagree.
Please explain:
12. WOULD YOU USE THIS COMPANY'S SERVICE AGAIN IN THE FUTURE?
A. Yes.
B. No.
Please explain:
13. WOULD YOU RECOMMEND THIS COMPANY TO A FRIEND OF
RELATIVE?
A. Yes.
B. No.
Please explain:
14. WHATIS YOUR GENDER?
A. Male
B. Female
15. WHAT IS YOUR RACE?
A. Non-Hispanic White
B. Non-Hispanic Black/African American
C. Latino
D. Asian
E. Other
16. How OLD ARE YOU?
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17. WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION?
A. Self-employed
B. Construction
C. Sales
D. Education
E. Healthcare
F. Hotel / Food Service
G. Other:
18. WHAT IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION THAT YOU
COMPLETED?
A. I did not complete high school
B. High school
C. Some college
D. Four year college
E. Post-college graduate education
19. PLEASE SHARE WITH US HOW YOU LEARNED ABOUT THIS COMPANY:
A. TV Ad
B. Radio Ad
C. Friend or Relative
D. Saw the store sign
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